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Survey Studies of Korea:

1. Preliminary Economic Survey of Korea, Far Eastern Unit, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 2 August 1943.
2. Survey of Korea, Military Intelligence Service, 15 June 1943.
3. Korea: Economic Survey, R&A No. 774, 5 August 1942.
4. Air Objective Folder: Korea Areas, August 12, 1944.
5. Korea, Ministry of Economic Warfare, 12.8.43.

OUTLINE OF KOREAN IMPLEMENTATION STUDY1. INTRODUCTION

Reference to Over-All China Plan.

2. SUMMARY OF SITUATIONa. Strategic Importance

MIS Survey, page 1.  
 Air Objective Folder, page 4.  
 Ilhan New, page 2.  
 Commerce Survey, page iv.

b. General Geographic Description

MIS Survey of Korea, pp. 2 ff.  
 MEW Korea, page 1  
 Cressy  
 Dept Commerce Study, pp. 1-3.

c. Military Considerations and Battle Order

MIS Survey of Korea, p. 172  
 MIS Survey of the Japanese Empire, 314-316.  
 Handbook of Japanese Army.  
 REQUEST BATTLE ORDER SUMMARY FROM SERGEANT BROWN, SI

d. Government and Control Measures

MIS Survey of Korea, 91-104. 246-252, 261.  
 Commerce: 7-8  
 NEW Survey, page 1.

e. Korean Independence Movement

MIS Survey of Korea, pp 104-110. 253-257  
 Survey of the Political Thought and Temper of  
 Korean People (State).  
 Korean Independence Movement (State)  
 Ilhan New's Plan.

f. Korean Resistance.

Ilhan New  
 Possible Contribution by Koreans, 6 pp. CID 70566.

g. General Economic Description, including very brief summary of Korean economy, importance to Japanese war-economy, Japanese control and domination, and general health of economic system (prices, commodity shortages, standard of living, etc.)

MIS Survey, 111, 112, 262-263, 258-260,  
 R&A Survey 1-4  
 Commerce Survey, iv, v, 51-60  
 Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan, Commerce, pages 29-41.  
 Civil Affairs Handbook, Korea, Section 7, Agriculture.

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SECRETh. Social Conditions, Morale, Attitudes, Emigration

General Psychological Factors in the Far East,  
Korea Section, OSS, September 21, 1942.  
Civil Affairs Handbook, Korea, Section 7,  
Agriculture (on tenancy, etc).  
MIS Survey, 51-87.

3. PERSONNEL

Ilhan New  
Possible Contributions by Koreans, 6 pp, CID 70566.  
Reports on Captain Weem's plans for recruiting Koreans.

4. INTELLIGENCE DESIRED

Stilwell Directives  
Could SI provide a new directive  
listing in order of importance  
intelligence needed from Korea?

5. SABOTAGE TARGETSa. Transportation Targets

(1) Over-All summary of importance and vulnerability  
of Korean Transportation

(2) Ports

MIS Survey, 154-164. 281-284  
MEW Survey, 2-6, 41-42.  
R&A Survey, 90-110 (Suitable for appendix).  
Commerce Survey, 80-82.  
Air Objective Study, 7,8.  
Army Engineers Railway study, 16-24.

(3) Railways.

Army Engineers Railway study. 4-15 (Describes  
system as a whole, enumerating main and  
branch lines, and giving information on  
employees, traffic, track, crossties,  
terminals, yards, bridges and tunnels,  
motive power and rolling stock, fuel and  
lubricants, water supply, signals)  
MEW Survey, 36-38. (Check sections on bridges)  
tunnels, etc.  
Air Objective Study, pages 9,10. Check for  
up-to-date information on some more  
important objectives. 41,43,17,22,24,51,23,12,47.  
R&A Survey, 69-79  
Commerce, pages 72-80  
MIS Survey, 143-150,  
Dept. of Justice Study, Jan. 12, 1943.  
Emmons: 4,5.

(4) Highways

Commerce, 82-84  
R&A Survey, 80-90  
MIS Survey, 151-154  
MEW, 35-36  
Engineers, 24,25.

(5) Shipping

MIS Survey, 154  
R&A Survey, 90

b. Industrial Installations

(1) Over-all Analysis of contributions of Korean  
industry to Japan's war economy; bottlenecks,  
critical industry, vulnerabilities.

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(2) Electric Power

Commerce: 26-30  
 Army Engineers: 15-16  
 Air Objective Folder: 6,7,34,37,49,55.  
 MIS, 138-142, 274-277  
 R&A: 50-64  
 Breger Reports (CID 21872 and 23324)

(3) Mining

Commerce: 31-36, 38-50  
 R&A: 12-22  
 MIS: 119-121. 126-134, 263-268  
 AIR OBJECTIVE: 44,6,8  
 MEW: 11-19  
 FEA Report on Far Eastern Coal Industry (CID 72366)  
 BEW Survey of Japanese Magnesium Resources (CID 28147)  
 Breger Report on Fluorspar (CID 23782)

(4) Smelting, Refining, Processing of Metals

Commerce: 36-38; 40-48  
 R&A: 12-22  
 MIS: 126-134  
 Air Objective Folder: 8,9,26,27,31,41,44, 48,53,54.  
 MEW: 11-19  
 Breger Reports listed above.

(5) Chemical Industry

Commerce: 62-65  
 R&A: 35-38,40  
 MIS: 132-34  
 MEW: 31-32, 33.  
 Air Objective Folder: 6,31,33,51.  
 Breger Reports.

(6) Oil Refineries

Commerce: 66.  
 R&A 39  
 MIS: 134  
 Air Objective Folder, 9,52,43,55.  
 JICA/CBI Report, October 9, 1944 (CID: 101982)  
 Emmons: 6

(7) Coal Liquefaction

Commerce: 66  
 R&A: 39-40  
 Air Objective: 43,55

(8) Munitions, Explosives.

Commerce: 60  
 R&A: 35-28,40  
 MEW: 33  
 Air Objective: 5,6,32,50,24  
 Emmons: 17

(9) Aircraft Manufacture

Commerce: 60  
 R&A: 38  
 MIS: 130  
 Air Objective: 5,25.  
 Emmons: 9.

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Commerce: 61  
 MIS: 129  
 Emmons: 3

(11) Cement

Commerce: 65  
 R&A: 40-41  
 MIS: 134  
 MEW: 32  
 Air Objective: 6, 25, 50, 51.

(12) Machine and Tools

Commerce: 60-62  
 MIS: 129

(13) Automobiles and Vehicles.

Commerce: 61  
 R&A: 38, 39  
 MIS: 128-129

(14) Railway Rolling Stock, etc. Mfr.

Commerce: 60, 61.  
 MIS: 128

(15) Textile Industries

Commerce: 68, 69  
 R&A: 41-42  
 MIS: 136  
 MEW: 32-33

(16) Alcohol

Commerce: 67  
 Report on Japanese Corn Products Co.  
 (CID 27959).

(17) Lumber, Pulp, and Paper

Commerce: 67  
 R&A: 41.  
 MIS: 134  
 MEW: 34

(18) Miscellaneous

Commerce: 69-71  
 R&A: 42-43  
 MIS: 136-138

(19) List of Industrial Cities together with specific industries in each.

R&A: 43-48  
 MIS: Appendix XV.

c. Storage Facilities

Emmons: 3, 6, 17.  
 Air Objective: 52  
 Commerce: 66

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R&amp;A: 121-125

Commerce: 85-86

MIS: 165-167, 287-299

MEW: 41.

Emmons: 10, 13

e. Airfields and Aircraft

Provisional Airfield List, China (including Korea and Manchuria), Enemy Airfield Information Report No. 2, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, 8 July 1944, CID 87267.

MIS: 186-189

Commerce: 84-85.

1. INTRODUCTION Air Objective Folder: 5

Reference to Over-All China Plan.

6. PERSONNEL TARGETS2. WHO'S WHO

Who's Who material is very limited and out-of-date. COULD BIOGRAPHICAL RECORDS PREPARE A WHO'S WHO?

APPENDICES

"A" - BATTLE ORDER FROM SERGEANT BROWN.

"B" - SUMMARY OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

SECTION I - PORTS

SECTION II - RAILWAYS

SECTION III - HIGHWAYS

"C" - SUMMARY OF INDUSTRIES.

"D" - WHO'S WHO.

c. Military Considerations and Battle Order

MIS Survey of Korea, p. 178

MIS Survey of the Japanese Empire, 214-216.

Handbook of Japanese Army.

REQUEST BATTLE ORDER SUMMARY FROM SERGEANT BROWN, MI

d. Government and Control Measures

MIS Survey of Korea, 51-104, 243-253, 251.

Commerce: 1-3

MEW Survey, page 1.

e. Korean Independence Movement

MIS Survey of Korea, pp 104-113, 253-257

Survey of the Political Thought and Temper of Korean People (State).

Korean Independence Movement (State)

Ilhan Yee's Plan.

f. Korean Resistance

Ilhan Yee

Possible Contribution by Koreans, 5 pp. CID 70856.

g. General Economic Description, including very brief summary of Korean economy, importance to Japanese war-economy, Japanese control and domination, and general health of economic system (prices, commodity shortages, standard of living, etc.)

MIS Survey, 111, 113, 252-263, 263-266,

MIS Survey 1-4

Commerce Survey, iv, v, 51-50

Civil Affairs Handbook, Japan, Commerce, pages 28-37

Civil Affairs Handbook, Korea, section 7, Agriculture

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6. PERSONNEL TARGETS IN KOREAa. Objectives(1) General Objectives.

(a) Parts of the Special Program No. 5 in the Over-All and Special Programs for Strategic Services Activities Based in China which are important for MO operations in Korea are as follows:

"Objective: Undermine the morale of the Japanese military and civilian personnel.

"Missions:

"a. Study the situation in ... Korea ... and prepare to attack by subversive means the morale of Japanese forces.

"b. By use of subversive means, attack the morale of Japanese forces of occupation.

"c. Exploit by subversive means the potential cleavages between the military clique of Japan and the population of Japanese-occupied ... Korea... in order to undermine the morale of the Japanese and impair the efficiency of Japanese prosecution of the war."

"d. Furnish such support to the U. S. military forces as is requested by the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, CBI, including the Commanding General, 14th U. S. Air Force."

(b) The following objectives are from Four Suggested Special Plans for Morale Operations Against the Japanese.

"a. To break the hold of the governing clique on the armed forces and the civilian population.

"b. To increase surrender and lower discipline and efficiency of the Japanese armed forces by morale operations directed at the specific components of these forces.

"c. To impede Japanese war economy particularly in the field of transportation and industrial, as well as agricultural, production, by campaigns directed at specific groups of war workers."

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(2) Specific Objectives.

(a) Japanese army and navy personnel. The objectives of MO operations should be to destroy the prestige of military and naval forces, to lower morale, to incite frictions among the leaders, to discredit key men by undermining their reputations in the eyes of the troops, and (in the period of military operations within Korea) to increase surrender and desertion.

(b) Japanese administrators. The objectives of MO operations should be to break the morale of government and business administrators by inducing fear of Korean resistance groups and by causing lack of faith in their own ability to handle groups of Koreans.

(c) Government Departments in Korea under Japanese Military Control.

b. Vulnerabilities of Groups in Korea.(1) The Japanese(a) Army and Navy Personnel

i. Army and Navy frictions and jealousies.

ii. Knowledge of the hatred which Koreans feel toward the Japanese.

iii. Resistance activity which may (later in the war) make them anxious regarding their personal safety.

iv. Knowledge that Koreans resisted the "Volunteer System" and now resist conscription and participation

(d) Korean administrators. The objectives of MO operations against this group should be to create friction between them and the Japanese, and to encourage half-hearted effort in Japanese affairs, and to increase acts of insubordination.

(e) Workers in transportation, mining, power plants arsenals, and other important industries. The objectives of MO operations should be to induce such workers to leave their jobs, to produce slow-downs, simple sabotage, non-cooperation; <sup>and</sup> to cause anxiety about their personal safety.

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(f) Farmers. The objectives of MO operations should be to induce farmers to keep their crops for their own use as well as for guerrilla and resistance groups and to increase non-cooperation with Japanese agricultural programs.

(g) Masses of the people. The objectives of MO operations should be to increase anti-Japanese feelings, to further hostility to and non-cooperation with government regulations regarding social customs, language restrictions, religious and political observances, labor recruiting, and conscription policies.

(h) Special groups. To convince underground groups such as underground Communist societies, Christian groups, and possibly smugglers, prostitutes, and dope-peddlers that co-operation with OSS activities would be mutually beneficial.

b. Vulnerabilities of Groups in Korea.

(1) The Japanese

(a) Army and Navy Personnel

- i. Army and Navy frictions and jealousies.
- ii. Knowledge of the hatred which Koreans feel toward the Japanese.
- iii. Resistance activity which may (later in the war) make them anxious regarding their personal safety.
- iv. Knowledge that Koreans resisted the "Volunteer System" and now resist conscription and participation in the war.

v. News of Japanese defeats in the Pacific.

(b) Administrators, business men, etc.

- i. Intra and inter-organizational jealousies.
- ii. Knowledge that they are hated by the Koreans.
- iii. Fear of bombing.
- iv. Impatience with Korean resistance against Japanese indoctrination.

(2) The Koreans

(a) Conscripts

- i. Realization that they are held in scorn by their

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fellow countrymen.

ii. Discrimination in treatment of Japanese and Korean soldiers.

iii. Arrogance of the Japanese.

iv. Japanese distrust of Korean conscripts.

v. Lack of enthusiasm for the war, which the Koreans feel is Japan's war, not Korea's.

vi. Possibilities for desertion.

(b) Korean officials.

i. Arrogance of the Japanese, to which the Koreans are very sensitive.

ii. Unequal treatment of Japanese and Korean officials.

iii. Unreasonable demands of Japanese for food, lodging, buildings, and troops.

iv. Unwillingness to give real power to Korean officials. Real authority is retained by the Japanese. Korean officials feel that they are patronized.

v. Feeling that imperialist Japan is draining Korean resources for a war in which the Koreans have no interest.

vi. Graft in government.

(c) Farmers, industrial and transportation workers, and the masses.

i. Arrogance and bad behavior by Japanese in Korea.

ii. Shortages of commodities resulting from shipments to Japan and Japanese Army requirements. (Children forced to go without shoes).

iii. High prices (for which Koreans blame the Japanese).

iv. Taxes have multiplied and the Koreans regard this as robbery.

v. Discrimination in business and wage scales favoring Japanese over Koreans.

vi. Labor conscription.

vii. Large Japanese land-holdings in Korea and unfair treatment of tenant farmers.

viii. Enforced shipment of rice to Japan while Koreans have to eat millet.

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ix. Conscription of men into the Japanese army.

x. Close and terroristic supervision of local daily life by the Japanese through the secret police and population control systems, unwarranted arrest and brutal treatment by Japanese police, questioning on "thought life" at police stations, and imprisonment of foreign-trained Korean men.

xi. Suppression of Korean language, customs, symbols, and newspapers, and efforts to Japanize the Korean population.

xii. Religious grievances including enforced Shinto and emperor worship, neglect of Confucian and Buddhist temples, and official regulation regarding the use of the Bible.

xiii. Discrimination favoring Japanese in educational opportunities.

xiv. Resentment against extensive use of Korean girls as "comfort troops" and the Japanese sponsored opium traffic.

c. Factors relevant to the carrying on of MO operations in Korea.

(1) For biographical data on Japanese and Korean personnel in Korea, see Appendix \_\_\_\_.

(2) For Korean Order of Battle, see Appendix \_\_\_\_.

d. Media for MO in Korea

(1) Clandestine Radio. No clandestine radio sending stations are known but small 2 or 3 tube receiving sets are common. Japanese sponsored programs are heard quite generally. Rumor could spread via this method. Short wave receiving sets are banned.

(2) Rumors. Rumors can spread very quickly in Korea (e.g. among women washing their clothes along the streams.)

(3) Leaflets, Posters. Education has been so restricted that the percentage of literacy in Korea is very low, but much can be done by the use of picture leaflets and posters.

(4) Personal contact.

(5) Poison-pen letters, false documents.

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