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## G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

by authority of the  
Commanding General  
Y-Force Operations Staff

FROM: 3 Sept 44 - 0001z

TO : 9 Sept 44 - 2400z

10 September 1944 *DN*Hq, Y-Force AN/KW  
APO 627

10 September 1944 - 1200z

No. 62

MAPS: ASIA, 1:1,000,000; BURMA (Survey of India) and WESTERN  
YUNNAN, 1:253,440.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.a. Enemy front line.- See overlay.c. Units in contact.-

TENGCHUNG: The remnants of the TENGCHUNG garrison, numbering approximately 200, were forced back into the NE corner of the town during the week. POW's taken on the 8th indicate that the Japs may attempt a final breakthrough.

MANGSHIH: Again, action in the MANGSHIH area centered around TUNGKUOYUEN (4 miles NE of MANGSHIH) where Jap forces persistently attack with forces varying in size, and on the 5th, attacked with 600 - 700 men but were repulsed with a reported 200 killed. From the dead Japs in this area the 9th Company, 3d Bn of the 29th Regt and also elements of the 113th Regt have been identified. Newness of equipment and clothing indicates that all troops are new arrivals. (XI G/A, 5 Sept, C-2).

With large forces withdrawn from MANGSHIH to the road block area in the N it is believed that only about 600 remain in the town itself.

LUNGLING: This area is the center of counter-offensive which the Japs are attempting to develop against the Chinese forces. The action in the road block area centered around the following places: CHANG CHING SHAN, HSIANG TANG, NANLIEN MEN, YICHOTIEN, SHANG PO, KUOTITANG and SAN KUAN PO. (See overlay insert for location and direction of attack).

The following identifications are reported to have been made by the Chinese from captured documents in the area of the road block just SW of LUNGLING: "W 46", "W 47", "W 48", "C 68", "E 22", "Unit 1301", "MANCHURIA 679", "Unit 13704", "Unit 1029", and 3d Co, 16th Regt:

"W 46"----- (Replacement unit for the 113th Regt,  
56th Div and also for the 114th Regt,  
18th Div).

"W 47"----- (Replacement unit for the 146th Regt, 56th  
Div; and also for the 55th Regt, 18th Div)

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- "W 48":----- (Replacement unit for the 148th Regt, 56th Div; and also for the 56th Regt, 18th Div).
- "C 68":----- (This unit is in the 168th Regt of the 64th Ind Inf Group and at present is carried in Japan; however, the April 1944 War Dept Order of Battle said, "It is thought the regts from this unit will appear as Inf components of other units.").
- "Units 1301 and 1302"--- (War Dept Order of Battle lists these as the 4th and 16th Regts respectively of the 2d Div). Documents captured by the 71st Army identifies the 16th Regt, 2d Div, by the code character "ISAMU" as well as the numeral "1302". Document says unit left HANGKOW 26 July; left NANKING 26 August and arrived MANCHURI 2 Sept. (XI G/A, 7 Sept, B-1).
- "MANCHURIAN 679":----- (This is the 63d Regt of the 10th Div; according to Chungking the Chinese have been carrying it in THAILAND, with this being the first reported identification by document. War Dept, however, still carries the 10th Div in MANCHURIA).
- "MORI 18704"; "MORI 1029"; "E 63": (All unknown).

SUNGSHAN: After occupying TACHAI on the 5th of September (counting 106 dead Japs and 6 "Comfort Girls") the Sinos finally (3 months and 28 days after the start of the campaign) took SUNGSHAN and thereby opened the BURMA ROAD as far as LUNGLING.

The original garrison is now estimated to have been 2,000. Along with SUNGSHAN the following equipment was captured:

- 8 medium artillery guns
- 4 light artillery guns
- 4 anti aircraft machine guns
- 4 anti tank guns
- 360 rifles
- 2 tanks
- 9 trucks

Only 9 prisoners were taken during this operation. In the final attack, 20 Japs escaped; however, 10 have been killed and the other 10 are being tracked down.

Following is an estimate of composition and strength of enemy forces facing CEF, based on probable casualties inflicted to-date: (Fld Hq, 7 Sept).

56th Div

148th Regt

- 1st Bn -- eliminated at MYITKYLINA
- 2nd Bn -- at TENGCHUNG. About 200 left; a force which can be written off in the mopping up of TENGCHUNG.
- 3rd Bn -- In the MANGSINH - LUNGLING area. On the basis of POW reports, the average strength can be taken at 75 per company.

Strength of 148th can be placed at 425.

146th Regt

- 1st and 3d Bns -- eliminated at MYITKYLINA.
- 2nd Bn -- remnants at PINGKA. About 300.

113th Regt

- 2nd Bn -- can be written off with fall of SUNGSHAN.
- 1st & 3d Bns -- remnants in LUNGLING - MANGSINH area.

Estimated at 75 per company, 113th Regt has 450.

Other units of 56th Div estimated at 200.

Total for 56th Div = 1,500 (in round numbers)

Considering the forces at TENGCHUNG and PINGKA, either eliminated or incapable of intervention elsewhere, we have 1,000. Of this number, a large number having been in action since the start of operations are wounded. Taking 25% as a conservative strength of the sick and wounded, the present effective strength of the 56th Div can be considered as one combat bn at approximately T/O strength.

18th Div

- 114th Regt -- Two companies of the 1st Bn in the MANGSINH - LUNGLING area. These companies have moved from NPIMAW to MANGSINH and took part in the abortive attempt to relieve PINGKA garrison, suffering heavy casualties. Probably no more than 100 remain -- less than an effective company.

53rd Div

119th Regt -- The 2nd Bn has been in the MANGSHIH - LUNGLING area since early June and has been subject to the same attrition as the 56th Div units. Probably 200 remain.

53rd Recon Regt -- About 200 estimated remaining.

Total for 53rd Div = 400.

Considering 25% as sick and wounded, the effective strength is 300, or about 1/2 of an effective combat bn.

Total for 56th, 18th and 53rd Divs = 1,250 or 1 1/2 combat bns.

The balance of Jap SALWEEN strength is derived from two sources:

- (1) Replacements for 56th Div.
- (2) 2nd Div troops.

Present estimate of Jap strength N and exclusive of MANGSHIH is 4,000. Strength at MANGSHIH and to SW is between 1,000 and 5,000, depending on validity of report of group of 5,000 reinforcements arriving at MANGSHIH. Subtracting troops accounted for above, there are between 3,800 and 8,800 troops to be accounted for. Of this number:

(1) Recent identifications of units "W 46", "W 47" and "W 48" establish the arrival of replacements for the 56th Div. We have no way of estimating the numbers of these units.

(2) Identifications made during the last few days establish beyond much doubt the presence of the bulk of the 2nd Div in or en route to the MANGSHIH - LUNGLING area.

2nd Div:

4th Regt -- Identified by code number 1301  
 16th Regt -- " " " " 1302 α POW  
 29th Regt -- 2nd Bn has been in the MANG-LUNG area for several months. 1st and 3rd bns reported en route here from DIAMO, with an identification of 3rd Bn already made.

Thus the 3,800 - 8,800 balance to be accounted for can be considered to be made up largely of 2nd Div units. This remains true whether the number is 3,800 or whether the actual arrival of reinforcements raises it to be the 8,800 figure. The bulk of the 2nd Div has not been previously committed and can be considered fairly close to T/O strength.

e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.- A POW states that the Hq of the 2nd Div is in MANGSHIH. There is also a report that the Adv Hq of the 33rd Army is in MANGSHIH. The 1st and 3rd Bns of the 29th Regt are reported by Chaduzup to be in the BHAMO area, en route to MANGSHIH. These reports, plus the identifications indicated above (Par 1,c), confirm the belief that the entire 2nd Div will soon find its way to the SALWEEN front. 5,000 Japs were reported to have moved into MANGSHIH on the night of the 6th in 300 trucks. (CEF, 7 Sept, C-3).

(Arrival of the COMBO patrol in the KOKANG area this week afforded us a new line for reports which have been coming heretofore through the British. Henceforth all reports from this source will be labelled "COMBO". The information contained cannot be considered confirmatory because it undoubtedly comes from the same basic sources). COMBO reported as of 1 Sept 5,000 Japs in KUNLONG while on the 6th, 500 Cavalry troops arrived there and at the same time 200 boats were massed along the SALWEEN in the area. In mid-August 15 tankettes were reported to have moved from HSENWI to KUNLONG. Large scale troop training with tankettes has been taking place in the SE-U area (SP 0002). (See overlay for reported moves and camps in the area). Comment: according to an American officer who has been in the area E of KUNLONG on patrol, this area would be passable for tankettes with a minimum of work; see overlay of this area with his comments).

FRENCH INDO-CHINA: Mentioned in our report No 61, 3 Sept, was movement of troops from INDO-CHINA to THAILAND. Breaking this down still further in a report dated the 8th of September, it was stated that the 5,500 included two regts of Inf, one regt of Arty and two companies of automobiles. The number of these units have not as yet been obtained. (French military mission, 6 Sept). The following Japanese strength in INDO-CHINA is reported as of the 2nd of September:

TONKIN -----	11,200
ANNAM -----	7,650
CAMBODIA -----	1,690
COCHIN CHINA -----	25,600

Total for INDO-CHINA = 46,140 (FMM, 6 Sept)

## 2. GENERAL OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary.- With the fall of SONGSHAN and the continued stagnant condition prevailing in the PINGMA valley, the Japanese this week continued their attempt to wrest the offensive from the hands of the Chinese. By the end of the week it was their actions that determined the course of events in the LUNGLING - MANG-SHIEH area. They had forced the Chinese troops into the defense in

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order to protect the recent successes in SUNGSHAN and prevent Jap reinforcements from reaching the beleaguered 200 in the TENGCHUNG garrison. The Japanese airforce was also much more active on the SALWEEN front this week.

b. Operations of component elements.-

(5) Combat aviation.- At 021445 and 030955 hrs, 8 planes were over SUNGSHAN. On the 2nd, 2 planes dropped 6 chutes at NE end of the Jap positions and on the 3rd, 7 chutes were dropped of which 2 were recovered by the Chinese. (8th Army, 3 Sept, B-2). 8 planes were reported over TENGCHUNG on 3 Sept. (2 Oscars, mark 1; 4 Oscars, mark 2; and 2 Dinahs). Two dropped 75-mm ammo, bombed and strafed - destroying 4 L-5's and damaging another. (53d Army, 3 Sept, B-2). At 1500 hrs on the 8th, 12 Zeros attacked air operations in the PAOSHAN area, causing following damage: shot down one transport loaded with troops; however, all of the crew and the troops with the exception of two soldiers were saved. Another transport on the ground was set on fire by a crashing Jap plane. 2 Jap Zeros were shot down and two were badly damaged.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Estimated enemy casualties.- On the entire front this week, the Japanese suffered approximately 1,600 casualties 1,200 of which were in the road block area to the SW of LUNG-LING. In addition to the casualties, one officer and two men surrendered in TENGCHUNG on the 8th and 5 more were taken prisoners.

d. Terrain not under our control.- Reports continue to be made of an airstrip to the W of MANGSHIH from Chinese sources which place it at HSUAN PANG (6 1/2 miles due W of MANGSHIH). All efforts to locate it have failed. (CEF, 5 Sept, C-2).

g. Enemy intelligence not covered above.- Japs in the WANTING - MANGSHIH area have been openly saying that they will launch an attack against YUNNAN in the middle of September and withdraw from BURMA and knock out China. (COMBO, 8 Sept, B-2). It is reported that troops coming from BHAMO stated that it has been decided not to defend BHAMO. (COMBO, 8 Sept, B-2).

FRENCH INDO-CHINA: 50,000 Japanese troops are reported to be moving from SAIGON to HANOI, concentrating N of the city. (Gen Chang Fa-Kuei, 4th war Zone, report dated 30 Aug, received 11 Sept, F-0).

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Incl: Two overlays and  
Incl: One annex with overlay to  
each recipient.

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ANNEX NO. 1 to G-2 Periodic Report NO. 62, dated 10 Sept 44, Hq, Y-Force.

(The following was prepared by 1st Lt WILLIAM W GUTH, Inf, O-1307685 who was on patrol in the area for several months).

From KONDONG to HOPANG the Japanese have built a two-lane all-weather road that is constantly in use both day and night. They ferry across the river and use a bridge at HOPANG. The terrain from HOPANG northwest along NAMTING river is very flat and easily traveled. They are able to use the abandoned railway bed as shown on overlay. This railway bed is destroyed about every two hundred yards but can still be used simply by going around the obstructions. After leaving the railway bed at MENGCHEN it is possible to travel by jeep or light tank to TACHAI, from TACHAI to the MENGSA valley the trail is very poor, usable only by pack animals.

The trail from MENGTING to KENGMA is in excellent shape except for a few washouts which could be easily repaired. From KENGMA to MENGSA the road is in good shape, very wide and fairly level. From MENGSA to CHIN MEN KOU the road is excellent. At CHIN MEN KOU there is a stretch of about seven kilos that is very rocky; after passing this the road is good until about 15 kilos past CHAPI with another stretch of about 10 kilos where the trail is narrow but usable. After this the road to YUNHSIEN is excellent and will carry vehicles.