

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

MRB/arm

CONFIDENTIAL

1944 OCT 13 PM 1 43

6 October 1944 Serial DIS-061505.

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
To : Distribution List.
Subj: CINCPAC-CINCPOM Preliminary POW Interrogation Report No. 75 - HOSHINO, Joichi; Superior Private; 18th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Battalion, Infantry Gun Company, Headquarters.

1. Subject Report, forwarded herewith, need not be reported and when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is necessary

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

NND 770092

By *KB/ETE* NARS, Date *10/31/22* M. R. B. CON,

By direction.

Reproduction of this material in any form is not authorized except by specific approval of the Secretary of the Navy

Encl:

1. Subject Report No. 75.

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

No. Copie

ARMY	- Chief Mil. Intell. Service.....	6
	Operations Div., War Dept.....	4
	Chief of Engrs., War Dept.....	4
	ComGenPOA, APO 958.....	5
	AC of S., A-2, 7th AF, APO 953.....	10
	Combined Operational Intell. Ctr., CGQ, SWPA.....	2
	Dir. Mil. Intell., Adv. Allied Land Hqs., Brisbane.....	3
	AC of S., G-2, Alaska Defense Command.....	2
	AC of S., G-2, Western Defense Command.....	2
	AC of S., G-2, SoPac Base Command, APO 502.....	2
	Chief of Engrs., GHQ, SWPA, APO 500.....	2
	AC of S., G-2, USA Forces, SWPA, APO 500.....	2
	AC of S., G-2, USAFFE, APO 501.....	3
	Engrs., USA Forces, APO 715.....	2
	D.M.I. GSI (t) Genl. Hqs., New Delhi, India.....	2
	CG, USAF, CBI, Rear Echelon, New Delhi, India.....	2
	BGS, Int. Advance Hqs. 11th Army Group, SEAC.....	2
	Dir. of Intell., SEAC, APO 432.....	2
	AC of S., G-2, APO 7.....	5
	AC of S., G-2, APO 27.....	5
	AC of S., G-2, APO 77.....	5
	AC of S., G-2, APO 98.....	5
	AC of S., G-2, APO 81.....	5
	AC of S., G-2, APO 96.....	5
	AC of S., G-2, Sixth Army, APO 442.....	2
	The Mil. Intell. Train. Ctr., Camp Ritchie, Md.....	2
	Dir. of Train., Arlington Hall Sta.....	2
	Comdt., M.I.S.L. School, Camp Savage, Minn.....	2
	CG, Army Unit, West Coast.....	2
	CG, Hqs. XXIV Corps, Attn. AC of S., G-2, APO 235.....	5
	CG, AF, Washington 25, D.C., Attn. AC/AS Intell.....	3
	AC of S., G-2, Hqs. 10th Army, APO 357.....	2
	Dir. of Intell., AF/POA, APO 953.....	2
	ComGen XX BomCommand, A-2, APO 493 (c/o P.O., N.Y.).....	2
	ComGen XXI BomCommand, A-2, APO 234.....	2
	AC of S., G-2, Attn: Chief, Capt. Pers. & Mat. Branch, MIS.....	2
NAVY	-Cominch.....	3
	CNO.....	14
	CNO (DMI, M.I.-2, War Office, Whitehall, London).....	2
	CNO (DNI, Admiralty, Whitehall, London).....	2

(Continued Reverse Side)

DISTRIBUTION LIST (Continued):

	<u>No. Copies</u>
NAVY -CNO (COIS, Eastern Fleet.....	1
Naval War College.....	1
CO, SEVENTHFleet Intell. Ctr.....	10
Directorate of Intell., Hqs. Allied Air Forces, SWPA.....	3
ATIS, SWPA.....	3
AICNA.....	3
CO, Naval Unit, West Coast.....	1
Dir. of Intell., Royal Australian Navy.....	1
ComTHIRDFleet.....	3
ComFIFTHFleet.....	3
ComSEVENTHFleet.....	3
ComForwardArea, CenPac.....	5
ComThirdPhibFor.....	5
Amphibious Forces, Pacific.....	50
ComSoPac.....	1
ComNorPac.....	1
ComHawSeaFron.....	1
ComWesSeaFron.....	1
U.S. Atlantic Fleet Air Force, (Air Information Center).....	1
Com 12ND.....	1
MARINES-Comdt., U. S. Marine Corps.....	5
CG, Marine Corps Schools.....	1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

CINCPAC-CINCPA PRELIMINARY POW INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 75

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>SERIAL NO.</u>
HOSHINO, Joichi 星野丈一	Superior Private	Cannot remember
<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DUTY PERFORMED</u>	<u>DATE AND PLACE OF CAPTURE</u>
18th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Battalion, Infantry Gun Company, Headquarters	Messenger	25 July 1944 GUAM

1. PREAMBLE

POW is 26 years old and unmarried. He has three brothers and three sisters. None of his brothers is in the armed services at the present time, he thinks. Before the war he lived at 8 HON-MACHI, NISHI-KU, NAGOYA SHI, AICHI KEN, and helped in his father's china (porcelain) exporting business. He is a graduate of the OSAKA Foreign Language School (GAIKOKUGO GAKKO), where he studied Hindustani and English for three years. In all he has had 14 years of schooling.

POW's military knowledge is not extensive. His most interesting remarks are recorded in Section 13. POW has never shown the least inclination to withhold information, and he gives the impression of being open and reliable. The information given here may be considered to be the facts as he remembers them or his true opinions.

2. CHRONOLOGY

1941

1 Dec. Conscripted into army at NAGOYA. Trained there until March 1942.

1942

End March-Went to HANKOW, CHINA, and fought with the 18th Infantry Regiment, 10th Infantry Company as a rifleman.

2 Sept. Went to HAICHENG (KAIJO 海城), MANCHURIA, with 18th Infantry Regiment for training and maneuvers.

1944

20 Feb. Left FUSAN (where unit had gone by train) for UJINA.

23 Feb. Left UJINA, passing close by FUSAN, on SAKITO MARU, in convoy of three transports (AKI MARU and TOSAN MARU) and three escort ships, presumably destroyers.

29 Feb. SAKITO MARU sunk between FORMOSA and SAIPAN by U.S. submarine. AKI MARU also hit, slightly damaged. POW was picked up by one of the escort ships

4 March Landed SAIPAN. Built fortifications.

2. CHRONOLOGY (cont'd)

1944 (cont'd)

- 7 May Left SAIPAN for GUAM on small ship carrying 3rd Battalion. Built fortifications at PITI Town (MINATO MACHI).
- 25 July Surrendered to U.S. Marines.

3. DETAILS OF CAPTURE

What remained of POW's company (18th Inf. Regt., 3rd Bn., Inf. Gun Coy) withdrew to AOBAYAMA Mountain, which is about five miles due east of PITI, on the evening of 21 July. They were unable to take the guns with them. They had water but no food, and they had before them only the prospect of being exterminated. Therefore on 25 July, POW, with another member of his company, YOKOTA, Shohei, Leading Private, deserted and surrendered to U.S. Marines.

4. ORGANIZATION

In the MARIANAS, POW belonged to the 18th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Gun Company. The 2nd Battalion, the 3rd Battalion, and the Communication Company went to GUAM. The 1st Battalion never left SAIPAN, POW thinks, although it was also supposed to go to GUAM. The unit was at only about half strength because of casualties incurred when the SAKITO MARU was sunk. POW's company was reduced to a strength of about 60 men.

Each battalion consisted of three rifle companies, one infantry gun company, one mortar company, and one work company (SAGYO CHUTAI --used flame throwers, set up barbed wire entanglements, etc.).

POW's company was divided into six squads for the six guns that they had.

The commanding officer of the 18th Infantry Regiment was Col. OHASHI, ---; the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion was Major YUKIOKA, ---; and the commanding officer of the 3rd Infantry Gun Company was TAKAHASHI, Shunji, 2nd Lt.

POW cannot recall the code number of the unit in the MARIANAS.

5. IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER UNITS

POW belonged to the same regiment in MANCHURIA, but there he belonged to the 10th Infantry Company (commanding officer--1st Lt. MATSUMOTO, Hiroshi). The regiment consisted of three battalions and a communications company; and each battalion consisted of four infantry companies, one heavy machine gun company, and an infantry gun company. The companies were organized into six barracks squads (NAIMUHAN). This "training organization", as the POW calls it, was changed to "combat organization" when the regiment went to the MARIANAS, by eliminating one rifle company and the machine gun company from each battalion. A work company (SAGYO CHUTAI) was formed from the personnel of these two companies; then the remainder were apportioned among the remaining companies of the battalion. POW at this time was transferred to the infantry gun company, although he was completely ignorant of guns of that size.

The regiment was commanded by Col. ISHII, Makoto, until 1943, then by Col. KADOMA, ---, and finally by Col. OHASHI, ---. The Manchurian code name was MANSHU 647.

At HAICHENG there were also a transport regiment (MANSHU 7,000),

5. IDENTIFICATION OF OTHER UNITS (cont'd)

POW also gave the number MANSHU 550 as that belonging to a higher echelon. He was not sure to what it belonged, but he knew that it applied to all the units at HAICHENG. It is perhaps the code name of the 29th Division or that of the headquarters of the 29th Division.

UNIT AT LIAOYANG (RYŌYŌ)


POW knew that the number of the infantry regiment at LIAOYANG was MANSU 574. It was therefore the 38th Infantry Regiment, 29th Division.

6. IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONALITIES

TAKASHIMA, Takeshi	Commanding General, 29th Division
OHASHI, -----	Colonel, Commanding Officer of the 18th Infantry Regiment in the MARIANAS.
ISHII, Makoto	Colonel, Commanding Officer of the 18th Infantry Regiment until 1943.
KADOMA, -----	Colonel, Commanding Officer of the 18th Infantry Regiment in 1943.
YUKIOKA, -----	Major, Commanding Officer of 3rd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment.
TAKAHASHI, Shunji	2nd Lt., Commanding Officer of 3rd Infantry Gun Company, 3rd Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment.
MATSUMOTO, Hiroshi	1st Lt., Commanding Officer of 10th Infantry Company, 3rd Battalion, 18th Inf. Regiment.

7. PARTICULARS OF POW'S UNIT

On both SAIPAN and GUAM, POW's company built emplacements or pill-boxes for these guns. They were improvised and not of much value, says POW. The three which they built on SAIPAN were of the following construction, about 10' by 13', inside dimensions.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~7. PARTICULARS OF POW's UNIT(cont'd)

Those on GUAM were essentially the same, but concrete was scarce, and the pill-boxes were of even less value. The only difference in construction from that indicated above is that they were made without rocks. The company built about 12 on GUAM, but not all were finished.

The guns could be depressed sufficiently to cover the beaches, and they had a lateral coverage of about 30°.

POW was messenger for company headquarters. He received orders from the battalion headquarters, took them to the company headquarters, and took orders to the various gun positions. There was no telephone. If one squad was at too great a distance from company headquarters, it functioned independently.

9. TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

The regiment had daily maneuvers in MANCHURIA, and two or three times a year there was a long maneuver lasting seven to ten days in the direction of LIAOYANG (RYOYO 遼陽), which was about 50 miles away.

When POW was transferred to the Infantry Gun Company he was given no formal training with guns, and he did not even know the caliber or type.

10. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

The company had no telephones. All orders were given by messenger.

11. DEFENSES

See Section 7 for a description of gun emplacements built on GUAM and SAIPAN.

12. ENEMY SUPPLIES

On GUAM, until the company had to retreat they had sufficient supplies. However, they were sparing in their use of them because they did not know when they would get more from JAPAN.

13. MORALE AND PROPAGANDA

This POW seems completely devoid of what we think of as the usual Japanese militaristic attitude--the attitude of "BUSHIDŌ", of dying for the Emperor, and of a sense of shame at being captured. He says he hated the Japanese army, and he voluntarily surrendered to the American forces. He was convinced that JAPAN would lose the war, and he reasoned that if he died he could be of no service; whereas if he surrendered, there was a chance that he could be of value. He is convinced that there will be a great need in JAPAN after the war for people who understand AMERICA and who are pro-American. POW fulfills these qualifications, he believes. One of his teachers in JAPAN was an American (Mr. Glenn SHAW), and POW has great admiration, he says for Americans and American democracy.

POW had a good mind and expresses himself well. He has been thinking a great deal, he says, about the causes of the war, the post war problem, the political significance of the Emperor, etc. He is perfectly capable of discussing the Emperor impersonally. The Emperor is only a figurehead ("TENŌ TO IŌ MONO WA KAMBAN DAKE DESU"), he says. He has no real power; and the government is utterly

~~-CONFIDENTIAL-~~

13. MORALE AND PROPAGANDA(cont'd)

controlled at present by the forces which caused this war. When asked who was responsible for the war, POW said both the capitalists, such as the MITSUI and the MITSUBISHI, and the militarists. He seems to lean toward the view that the capitalists are mainly responsible and that they drew the anti-American militarists into their power and used them as tools. (POW insists upon recognizing the fact that there are good men as well as bad among the military.) At any rate, these groups urged war with such fallacious reasoning as "HAKAI WA KENSETSU WO UMU", which may be translated freely as "Destruction bears the fruit of progress". Witness (goes the argument) greater TOKYO being built from the ashes of the earthquake of 1923.

But POW is by no means of the opinion that the Emperor should be eliminated. He reasons that since the Emperor has no power, he therefore has no responsibility for this war. POW firmly believes that the Emperor is necessary to hold the Japanese people together. The Emperor is of tremendous traditional significance; and POW does not believe that it would be possible to control the Japanese people without him. They are not trained for fully democratic government. It would be a tremendous mistake to eliminate the Emperor, for nothing could be gained, and everything could be lost. The TAISHO emperor was not very intelligent; nevertheless, the government was good. It would be possible for the Emperor to be completely mad, and no harm would come of it because he would still provide the bond holding together the Japanese people. It is only necessary, then, to have in the government good leaders who are, like Prince KONOYE, intelligent, cultured, and pro-American. In short, POW has no quarrel with the Emperor as a figurehead or "signboard" (the Japanese KAMBAN literally means "signboard"). When interrogator pointed out that it might be argued that the divine signboard of the Emperor offers an excellent screen for nationalistic and militaristic forces to hide behind, he agreed in part; but still thought that it was only necessary to change the things for which the Emperor stands--to have him controlled by forces which are pro-American and not inimical to world peace.

When asked what he thought would happen and how the Japanese people would react if JAPAN were invaded, he stated positively that he believed that the people would arise and stop the war before such a thing could occur. Further bombing of JAPAN herself would force a surrender, he believes.

When asked whether AMERICA had any responsibility for the war, he reserved judgment, pleading lack of knowledge; but he agreed with the interrogator that the immediate responsibility certainly lay with JAPAN.

When asked if he had been able to discuss such matters as these in JAPAN, he said absolutely not; had he done so he would have been arrested. Yet he is of the opinion that the number of people who hold similar ideas is very large; in other words, that a latent liberalism exists.

POW obviously enjoyed the opportunity of expressing himself, and when asked if he could talk in the same vein to other POWs, he answered that there was only one other POW (YOKOTA, Shohei) who held essentially the same views. It is at the moment impossible to discuss these matters with the other POWs, but he indicated that he believed that they were gradually beginning to veer toward the same attitude.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~13. MORALE AND PROPAGANDA(cont'd)

POW has never seen American propaganda leaflets, and had not heard of any on GUAM. Furthermore, he does not believe that they would be effective for troops, because the officers could so easily neutralize their effect. Loudspeakers, however, could have a tremendous effect. (POW heard no loudspeakers on GUAM, but heard that there were some). POW recommends short sentences which point out the real situation and which make an immediate emotional appeal, rather than a logical, intellectual one. The following is an example of what POW thought would be effective. (A translation follows Japanese text.)

"TEIKO SHITEMO DAME DA. SUDE NI OMAETACHI WA. HOI SARETE IRU. DANYAKU YA SHOKURYO MO NAI DARO. KAMBUTACHI WA OMAETACHI TO ISSHO NI IRU KA? FUSHOSHA WA TAKUSAN YASEN BYOIN NI SHUYO SARETE IRU. SHINSETSU NI KAIHO SARETE IRU NO WO SHINJINAI KA?

"TATAKAI NI YABURETA NO WA OMAETACHI NO SEKININ DE WA NAI. HORYO WA RIPPA NI SEKININ WO HATASHITA MONO DA KARA TEKI DE WA NAI. RIPPA NI KYUYO SARETE, SENSU GA OWAREBA Tsuma NI MO OYA NI MO KODOMO NI MO AERU DARO. TAKUSAN NO HORYO GA ANSHIN SHITE, SENSU NO OWARU NO WO MATTE ORU."

The preceding may be translated as follows:

"Resistance is useless. You are already surrounded. Your food and ammunition are gone, aren't they? Are your leaders with you? (KAMBUTACHI-officers and non-commissioned officers; POW does not mean the leaders in JAPAN; he is alluding to officers deserting their men.) Many of your wounded are being cared for in field hospitals. Don't you think that they are being cared for considerably?

"It is not your responsibility that you were beaten in battle. A captive is one who has admirably fulfilled his responsibility, and because of that he is not an enemy (i.e., there is no reason to kill yourselves; you have already done your duty. POW was not impressed by interrogator's remark that the above sentence is ambiguous. He seems to think that it would be effective.) You will be provided with food and clothing, and when the war is over, you will see your wives, your parents, and your children. Many captives are awaiting the end of the war without anxiety."

(Although the above seems to lack strength and conviction, it must be remembered that it is designed for oral delivery, and that those who hear it are already in a mental state where that very combination of short statements with an emotional appeal, no matter how ambiguous or confused in logic, might be effective.)

PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS

POW believes on the other hand that propaganda leaflets could have considerable effect on civilians if they were available soon enough, preferably before the invasion. He has offered to, and has, of his own volition, written several examples which he believes would be effective. Because of space considerations, these are omitted.

POW does not believe that civilians would ever commit suicide of their own volition. If they seem to have done so, it is because they were ordered to do so or because they were killed to prevent their giving away valuable information.

Morale at HAICHENG was excellent. Quarters and food were very good. There was a movie at which ordinary domestic films and an occasional newsreel were shown. Troops had one day of liberty per week, and leisure at night for writing letters, etc.. Beer and SAKE were available at the canteen.

-CONFIDENTIAL-

13. MORALE AND PROPAGANDA(cont'd)

Discipline was strict, and in battle areas it was almost unbearable. The worst offenders, says POW, are those who have come up from the ranks.

POW expected good treatment from the Americans, and he has not been disappointed. He has no complaints about his treatment as a prisoner.

15. WASTAGE AND CASUALTIES

POW confirms the reported sinking of the SAKITO MARU between SAIPAN and FORMOSA on 29 February 1944. Casualties were high, and the 3rd Battalion was reduced to approximately half strength. All the guns of POW's company were lost, and new ones had to be brought from JAPAN.

At the same time the AKI MARU was hit by a torpedo and slightly damaged.

16. CHEMICAL WARFARE

POW has never heard of poison gas (or even tear gas) being used in this war. His unit was equipped with gas masks, but the troops threw them away in order to eliminate the extra weight.

17. MILITARY AND NAVAL BASES

Appendix 1 is a plan drawn by POW, of HAICHENG and of the military unit there. All military buildings were of brick with corrugated steel roofs except for the warehouses, which were of wood. The barracks of the 18th Infantry Regiment had two stories; other buildings were of one story.

There is no airfield at HAICHENG.

POW does not know what units are at HAICHENG now, but believes that some have been sent there from JAPAN.

21. MISCELLANEOUS


At HAICHENG Korean women were brought in as prostitutes. They were examined for disease. Troops were forbidden to go to the civilian houses of prostitution in the town.

-----The information herein has been obtained from Prisoner of War sources and must be judged accordingly-----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HAICHENG

APPENDIX 1



--- The information herein has been obtained from Prisoner of War sources and must be judged accordingly ---