53/1

CONFIDENTIAL

File WDR

COPY # 5

OFFICE OF THE A. C. of S., G-2
HEADQUARTERS, U.S.A.F.F.E.
A.P.O. 501

4 September 1944

INTERROGATION REPORT #158.

1. This report covers interrogation of DR. THEODORE GEORGE BRAUN, Missionary evacuated from Hollandia by U. S. Forces on 25 April 1944.

2. Information contained in this report is based solely on interrogation of Evacuee and should be evaluated accordingly.

John N. Irwin II
JOHN N. IRWIN, II,
Lt. Col., G. S. C.,
Acting A.C. of S., G-2.

Place of Interrogation: 85th Station Hospital, APO 923.
Date of Interrogation : 10-13, 15 August 1944.

DISTRIBUTION	NO. OF COPIES
A C of S, G-2, WD	3
A C of S, G-1, GHQ	1
A C of S, G-2, GHQ	2
DMI Adv LHQ	2
D of Int, Allied Air Force	1
A C of S, USASOS	1
NEFIS	1
ATIS	1
FELO	1
AGS	1
Dir Gen CSS, Canberra	1
Deputy Director CSS, Q'land	1
CIC	6
A C of S, G-2, Hq 6th Army	2
A C of S, G-2, Hq I Corps	2
MIS-X	1
File	1

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 158

I. PERSONAL DATA

NAME	:	THEODORE GEORGE BRAUN
AGE	:	41
SEX	:	Male
RACE	:	White
CITIZENSHIP	:	U.S.
BIRTHDATE AND PLACE	:	29 March 1903; Weyerts, Nebraska
EDUCATION	:	1910-1918 Grammar School, Krem, N.Dak 1918-1922 Eureka Lutheran Academy, Eureka, S.Dak. 1922-1924 Wartburg College, Clinton, Iowa, Pre-Medical 1924-1925 Univ. of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Pre-Medical 1925-1927 Univ. of S.Dak., Vermillion, S.Dak., Medical 1927-1929 Univ. of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., Medical 1929-1930 Univ. of Tuebingen, Wurtenburg, Germany, Tropical Surgery 1937-1937 Columbia Univ., N.Y.C., Post Graduate, Medicine and Surgery
STATUS	:	Evacuee: Missionary released by U.S. Military Forces at Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea
OCCUPATION	:	Physician
PERSONAL DESCRIPTION	:	Height 5'9" Weight 160 lbs. Hair Brown Eyes Brown Comp. Ruddy Stature Medium
STATE OF HEALTH	:	Good
MEANS OF IDENT.	:	Passport #43745, issued 15 June 1937, Washington, D.C.

Interrogated 10-13, 15 August 1944 at 85th Station Hospital, APO 923.

REG/efs

ESTIMATE OF INTELLIGENCE AND RELIABILITY:

Dr. BRAUN's discretion, integrity and loyalty appear to be above reproach. The account of his experiences as an internee of the Japanese has been corraborated, to a great extent, by Mild, Haferman and Mager. Superior intelligence. Although Dr. BRAUN rendered medical assistance to the Japanese occasionally, he did it to keep his group from perishing from hunger.

II. CHRONOLOGY


1930	Arrived at Finschhafen, New Guinea. Employed as Physician by American Lutheran Church
1933	Transferred to Madang. Continued with medical duties.
1936-1937	Furlough to the United States
1937-1943	Continued medical work at Madang area.
1 Jan 1943	Captured by Japanese Military Forces at Amele Station.
20 Feb 1943	Moved to Ragetta Island (also known as Gragat Is)
7-10 Aug 1943	Went to Siar Island
24 Oct 1943	To Bunabun
25 Oct 1943	Sent to Manam Island
3 Feb 1944	Taken to Hansa Bay
6 Feb 1944	Wewak
8 Feb 1944	To Hollandia
25 April 1944	Rescued by American Military Forces

III. TACTICAL DATA ON ENEMY MILITARY FORCES

Insignia:

Dr. BRAUN noted the following insignias worn by the Japanese:

Double Keel Motor Boat repair crew: Small green felt pine tree on khaki background.




Garrison Troops: Black or blue triangle. Officers sometimes wore the triangle on a white arm band.

Military Police (Kempei): White arm band with red Japanese characters.


Clerks and Secretaries: White band on back of cap.

Infantry: Black stitched characters on khaki-colored felt background.

Engineers: Red felt on aluminum-colored felt background. Sometimes the insignia is made of metal and tacked on the soldiers uniform.




Anti-Aircraft: Red felt on khaki-colored felt background.



Intelligence: Circular cloth patch containing a figure (sketch below). Circle was said to be missing in some cases. Design was outlined in black, the background being khaki. Informant observed this insignia on personnel from the rank of private first class to Lieut. Colonel. This distinctive badge was worn above their insignia of rank on the left breast.




Also, the Intelligence branch had a small brass button, about one-half or three-quarters of an inch in diameter, which is usually worn on the under side of the coat lapel. Civilian-dressed personnel and those who wish to conceal their identity wear these buttons. According to evacuee, a picture of this button can be found in the back side of the Japanese Infantry Manual, which is a red-colored book, approximately 4" x 6" and 2" thick.




Lines indicate impressions and depressions on surface of button

The following are the insignias for two unknown branches of the service:

Red or green felt on khaki-colored felt.



A brown button sewed on a khaki-colored cloth background.



Intelligence Units and Methods:

According to Dr. BRAUN, he met two Japanese officers and several enlisted men in the Intelligence Interrogation Section. Lt. Col. Yamada was an Intelligence Officer assigned to an Engineer unit. He was in charge of securing information and documents in the Madang Area from January to April 1943, at which time Lt. Col. Miasawa was placed in charge of the Intelligence work. Miasawa seemed to devote most of his time to interrogation, securing data for maps, locating documents and papers on history and culture of New Guinea. Dr. Braun was very deeply impressed with the attitude taken by various groups in regard to Intelligence information which they secured. There appeared to be a jealousy in regard to forwarding information to the higher headquarters. Units would conceal military information from each other which they had learned from other sources.

Enemy Materiel and Equipment:

For the most part, the Japanese were very careful in keeping the Evacuees some distance away from their installations, equipment and materiel. However, Dr. BRAUN walked up to a deserted machine gun post on Ragetta Island and counted thirty cartridges in the clip. It was assumed from bits of conversation overheard from the Japanese soldiers that they had sufficient supplies of arms and ammunition. That was true at Amele, Ragetta, Sier, and Manam. It was not determined whether there were sufficient supplies at Hollandia inasmuch as there was contact with only a small group of service troops.

Captured Documents and Interrogation of POW:

The Japanese Intelligence seized a few maps from the Catholic and Lutheran groups covering the region along the coast from the Sepik down to the Finschhafen area. However, the maps were old and the scales of the maps belonging to the Catholic group did not match with the scale belonging to the Lutheran group. The Japanese were suspicious of the map discrepancies. The Japanese Intelligence ransacked the libraries belonging to the Catholic and Lutheran missions in both Alexishafen and Madang areas, looking for material on New Guinea history, resources, topography, and native culture. Evacuee was forced, at the point of a bayonet, to sketch a few roads and trails in the Amele region.

In July, 1943, the Japanese were seen with copies of maps of the New Guinea region with up-to-date information regarding roads, terrain, and native villages. The Japanese probably secured the maps from a salvaged American plane. The copies were printed in English. Dr. BRAUN asked the Japanese Intelligence why they didn't photograph their own maps. The Japanese replied that they were not a rich country like America.

Dr. BRAUN stated that he and his staff at Amele were questioned and required to fill out personal history statements by the Japanese the same day the Japanese entered his mission, 1 January 1943. The Japanese were suspicious of the Americans, Australians, and Germans alike, suspecting that they were spies left behind. When Nurse Klotzbuecher (Australian), a member of the Amele hospital staff, was asked about her nationality, the Japanese interrogation staff became excited when she told them that she was an Australian naturalized citizen of German parentage. They could not understand why she would give up her German citizenship. That same night, a Japanese soldier came into the women's room, flashed a light in Nurse Klotzbuecher's face and called out in broken English, "Jew, Jew". It is not known what was the purpose of the soldier's visit.

The evacuees were required to fill out personal history statements each time they were moved to a new location.

Location of POW Camps:

At Siar Island, during the month of August 1943, a Japanese Sgt. Major, name unknown, informed evacuee that 250 missionaries, Catholics and Protestants, were interned at Kokopo, New Britain. The missionaries had been gathered from the Solomons, New Ireland, New Britain, and Buna, New Guinea, according to the Japanese Sgt. Major. He also said that several half-caste girls were housed at Kokopo too. Twelve half-caste girls at Kokopo were killed by a bomb which struck a shelter that they were hiding in. At Hollandia Dr. BRAUN heard that sixty internees at Kokopo had been killed. Their nationalities were not determined.

Dr. BRAUN had no further tactical information to furnish than that already covered in Milo, Haferman, and Mager's reports.

VIII. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION

General Living Conditions:

General living conditions under the Japanese domination were deplorable. If it wasn't for the fact that the Japanese had a few kind sentries who secured a little food on the sly, a few clothes and jewelry bartered by the evacuee, and a few medical services rendered in exchange for food, the evacuees would have starved to death. A certain Japanese Major told Dr. BRAUN that it was quite enough if he furnished a guard detail to watch them; that he didn't have to furnish the food for them. The living conditions have been covered in the interrogation reports mentioned above.

Security Regulations and Censorship:

The Japanese were very strict about keeping the evacuees away from their vital military installations and materiel. They also were extremely cautious in talking about matters of a military nature in front of the evacuees.

Dr. BRAUN revealed that the Japanese troops had no marks on their uniforms to indicate the number of their units. Furthermore, from conversation with several Japanese soldiers, it is believed that many of their officers had aliases. It seems that in many cases the soldiers know only the officers' aliases.

Relation Between Japanese and Local Population:

This has been amply covered by a report, under separate cover, which deals with Japanese-New Guinea native relations.

Education:

From Japanese soldiers who had taken pidgin-English instruction at Amron Dr. BRAUN was able to learn that the first pidgin-English school was held at Rabaul in 1942. However, in the Wewak, Madang and Finschhafen landings, there were no pidgin-English interpreters included. Kato, a Japanese interpreter, opened the pidgin-English school at Amron in April 1943.

Native schools were continued by Japanese interpreters, but the schools were conducted in a very half-hearted manner.

Health and Sanitation:

This section has been covered in the report on Japanese-New Guinea Native relations.

Medical Treatment and Supplies:

This section has been generally covered in the report on " Japanese Medical Treatment." However, it is noted that the Japanese medical department of the Army officially gave Dr. BRAUN two bottles of quinine, a few packages of bandages, and a package of gauze during the fifteen months he was interned by them. Moreover, several of the Japanese officers and enlisted men used to come to Dr. BRAUN for a medical check-up rather than go to their own medical officers for sick call. Furthermore, he filled teeth for over 200 Japanese soldiers.

The Japanese medical officers were complacent and indifferent toward Dr. BRAUN's assistance to the missionaries who were injured during the strafing incident just off Wewak, 6 February 1944. Dr. BRAUN was given two packages of bandages and 1 package of gauze to give the wounded patients at Wewak. A few Japanese medical assistants helped bandage the minor cases first, and worked on the more serious cases later. The Japanese medical assistants left for lunch at noon and returned at approximately 4 p.m. In the meantime, the evacuees had received nothing to eat. Dr. BRAUN was not certain whether the Japanese fed the half-castes or not.

The Japanese would not let Mrs. Braun assist in dressing the wounds of the injured at Wewak. The reason -- unknown.

The Japanese troops were supplied with sufficient quinine and atebrine tablets; they were schooled in first aid hints; and they had some black pills which were very effective for dysentery.

Treatment of Prisoners of War and Internees:

Dr. and Mrs. BRAUN were not maltreated physically by the Japanese. However, they were kept almost continuously in a starved condition. Furthermore, they were threatened occasionally that if anyone of them should ever escape, the remainder of them would be killed. On one occasion, when a Japanese soldier threatened to strike Dr. BRAUN, he made the soldier feel very ashamed by telling him that all other Japanese soldiers that he had met were gentlemen.

IX. ECONOMIC INFORMATION

Agricultural Commodities:

The two large Japanese Farming Companies in control of all Japanese food production in New Guinea are the Mitsui and Mitsubishi outfits. They are in charge of the Japanese gardens, such as the locations of the gardens, care and harvest of the crops, and the distribution of the garden products. The natives formed the chief source of supply of labor for the gardens. They were given little or no pay for their services. However, they were given loincloths, knives and other articles which had been looted from the Mission's storehouses. But when these articles ran out, the natives had to continue working without pay.

The Japanese grew Chinese cabbage, taros, yams, and beans. Furthermore, the Japanese said that they tried to grow cotton in New Guinea but with little success.

At Siar, New Guinea, Japanese agricultural specialists, with college backgrounds, made frequent visits to the Japanese gardens in that area. These agricultural specialists were given the same respect as officers of the Japanese Army.

Communications:

Wireless: Dr. BRAUN stated that the Japanese had a motor-driven machine attached to the wireless which they used when they first arrived in Amele, January, 1943. Also, they strung out their antenna on the

ground near the set. Furthermore, the Japanese confiscated all radio sets belonging to the missions in the Madang and Alexishafen areas. Mr. Radke, a member of Dr. BRAUN's group, was forced to repair the receiving sets as long as he could improvise the parts.

Mail: A Japanese soldier informed evacuee that they could not correspond with their friends and relatives at home for three months before they embarked for overseas. And, once they have arrived overseas, they are allowed one post card home every two months. However, the Japanese soldier is allowed to send letters to fellow soldiers in the same or other theaters of war.

Food:

Officially, the Japanese Army assumed a very lax and nonchalant attitude toward the evacuees in regard to their welfare. They were more interested in seeing that they were properly guarded. However, Dr. BRAUN maintained a few fish traps and was able by that method to keep up their meat diet to barely above a malnutrition level. Mrs. Braun sewed and patched clothes for the Japanese soldiers. Some of them, in turn, gave them a few vegetables and fish on the sly. On another occasion, Dr. BRAUN sold a watch to Yamaguchi, an office soldier, for 75 lbs. of rice. Dr. BRAUN and his group had dysentery at first, which was due to eating mostly coconuts. On still other occasions, Japanese soldiers gave the BRAUNs yams and tapioca for dressing their wounds.

Clothing:

The common Japanese soldier had a very limited supply of personal clothing; the officers had more. Mrs. BRAUN spent much of her time patching and mending clothes for both the officers and men.

X. PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE INFORMATION

Allied:

Non-Radio Propaganda: The only instance in which Dr. BRAUN is acquainted is the time when Allied planes dropped leaflets to the natives in the Madang area, requesting them to flee to the hills from the Japanese. Otherwise, they would be punished later if they remained. The natives were confused as to the line of action to take. They knew that they would starve if they fled to the hills, yet they feared reprisals if they stayed at their villages. They remained, for the most part.

Enemy:

Morale of Enemy Forces:

Attitude Toward Capture: Dr. BRAUN said that one Japanese soldier talked to him in private and informed that he would be willing to surrender to the Americans but not to the Chinese. He was a veteran of the Chinese war. Japanese soldiers have stated that if they surrendered they would not be able to return to their homeland. On the other hand, if they were knocked unconscious and captured later, then they would be allowed to return to Korea or Manchuria, but not to Japan. The average Japanese soldier is convinced that the Americans torture their prisoners. They have heard that the Americans ran over Japanese prisoners with their tanks at Buna Buna. Moreover, the Japanese think it is very cowardly for the Americans and Germans to raise their hands and surrender. One Japanese officer told Dr. BRAUN that he was going to study American psychology after the war and try to figure how the American minds work.

Attitude Toward War: The ordinary English-speaking Japanese soldier regards the Emperor as the direct descendant of God and the whole world must come under the control of the Emperor sooner or later. They believe that all industry and resources are held in trust of their Emperor. They realize that United States, Great Britain, and others will not acquiesce to the Japanese plan and, therefore, they must be gained by war.

At Amele, the Japanese soldiers who arrived first were veterans of Malaya and Singapore. New Guinea was the first place where they had encountered real opposition from white men. The soldiers said that they were bound for Port Moresby, that their Emperor instructed them to go to Port Moresby, and also that the war would be over in six months. These first troops were not indoctrinated in the idea of conquering the United States. They were quite satisfied in capturing the Pacific Islands, including Australia, Hawaiian Islands, and Aleutians. However, a few Japanese soldiers said that it would be nice to go to Hollywood to see the beautiful girls.

A Japanese officer informed Dr. BRAUN that at Salamaua and Lae for the first time in Japanese military history a Japanese General retreated. He added, however, that the retreat was strategy only, and not defeat.

Effect of War News: Japanese returning from the defeat south of the Markham Valley seemed to have little effect on the morale of troops in the Madang area.

Effect of Air Raids: At Manam, Dr. BRAUN heard a Japanese officer admit that not only had Japan lost air supremacy, but also naval supremacy.

Protracted bombing raids had a definite effect on the Japanese soldier's morale. They were terror-stricken each time the Allied planes came over. Invariably, the Japanese would all try to get in the same fox hole with the evacuees. It was Dr. BRAUN's impression that the Japanese had a feeling of security in being near the evacuees during a bombing raid. There was a Japanese soldier at Hollandia who had run away from Wewak because of the terrific bombing raids there. He said that he didn't care what punishment he received because he expected to die anyway.

Changes in Morale: At Siar a Sgt. Major of the Kempai stated that all soldiers were ordered to send a lock of hair and some fingernails to their homes to be burned in the shrine in case they did not return. This was in July, 1943. About the same time, Japanese soldiers were saying that it would take 99 years to defeat the white man, and that the war would not be won by them, nor their children, but by their grandchildren. They seemed to take for granted that they would die in New Guinea.

XI. ATROCITIES:

Hearsay:

Reference is made to the G-2 report made at APO 442 on 5 June, 1944, regarding the Allied flyers reported killed by Allied bombs in late September, 1943. Hearsay from the natives reported that the Sgt. from Friedericksburg, Texas, had attended the Lutheran College at Seguin, Texas. It is believed that several of the Siar natives saw the airmen who were caged at Amron. A native from Gragat, named Siming, worked for several years in BRAUN's hospital and is known to be loyal and intelligent. He would be able to assist in locating some Siar native who may know of the executions at Amron.

Reference is also made to the G-2 report made at APO 442 on 5 June 1944 regarding the alleged murders of Rev. M. Dott and W. Wenz. The following is a list of names of natives who may be able to establish definitely whether these two men were killed by the Japanese:

The husband of Dula -- Je-Elso village. (He was in the group with Dott).
Alimel -- of Omeru (He was forced to go to Lae)
Fulalek -- of Oiha
Fafaik -- of Aijob
Siming -- of Gragat
Josef -- of Gragat
Saik -- of Ageru
UD -- of Amele or Je-Elso

XII. PERSONALITIES:

Army Personnel:

Lt. Col. Miasawa -- Intelligence Officer, 45 years, 5'5", 150 lbs., greying hair, no glasses, bow-legged, walks on outside of feet, a mild-mannered man. First Contact - April or May, 1943 at Gragat.

Lt. Col. Yamada -- Intelligence Officer, attached to an Engineer outift, 40-50 years, 5'4", 120 lbs., round face, short mustache, long neck (outstanding juglar veins), no scars or marks, military bearing, wears many cords and tassels on uniform, speaks and understands German and English fairly well.

1st Lt. Muira -- Commanding Officer of an Infantry outfit, 30 years, 5'4", 130-135 lbs., rounded features, bow legged, no distinguishing scars or marks, poor military bearing, lazy, kind man.

Fukuma -- Commanding Officer on Ragetta Island, 1st Lt. insignia with a Captain's rating, 30-35 years, 5'8", 150 lbs., walks with a slouch, can understand a little English, helped secure food for evacuees, kind man.

Japanese Officer (Name unknown) -- 1st Lt., dispatcher for wooden barge section at Madang, 35 years, 5'5", 145 lbs., narrow face, prominent nose, no mustache, no distinguishing scars or marks, mean attitude.

Torino -- Warrant Officer, 28 years, 5'2", 100 lbs., myopic, in the Army for 9 years, had been Cpl. in the Kempei, detached from Kempei, assigned to the Intelligence as interpreter for Col. Miasawa, speaks both English and pidgin-English.

Sgt. Fujimoto -- Interpreter for Yamada, 30-35 years, 5'7", 150 lbs., round face, shifty eyes, arrogant expression on his face, no distinguishing scars or marks, very good knowledge of English, speaks English fairly well, called "swine" by Superior Private Haraguchi, heavy drinker, has visited the United States, described as mean.

Cpl. Yamaguchi -- 25 years, 5'3", 118 lbs., no distinguishing scars or marks, spoke a bit of English, spoke Russian, attended a Methodist mission school in Japan, son of three-star General Yamaguchi; an office soldier.

Sgt. Kasai -- In charge of native relations in Madang area, 30 years, 5'3", 120 lbs., no distinguishing scars or marks, oval type of face, stoopshouldered.

Superior Private Haraguchi -- Interpreter, 27 years, 5'9", 155 lbs., inclined to be knock-kneed, secured food for the evacuees at Ragetta, criticized Japan's policy, liked the Americans and felt sorry for the Koreans; heard from a Kempei that Haraguchi was sent to Palau in Aug or Sept, 1943 to take care of prisoners. Haraguchi was a former government employee in Manchuria.

Kato -- Three-star private, instructor in pidgin-English school at Amron, 29 years, 5'2", 11[illegible] lbs., native of Japan, university education, speaks English and pidgin-English well, very cagey, cunning and mean, and disliked by natives at Ragetta.

XIII. GENERAL

Kempei:

The Kempei receives the same pay as flyers and submarine personnel. The Kempei organization is separate from the Army. They can appeal to the Kempei headquarters at Tokyo. Whenever the Kempei is short of personnel they recruit combat soldiers. The regular Kempei soldier, however, receives his police training in Tokyo. They are in charge of all executions, native affairs, and check on soldiers' morale. The average Japanese soldier has a great fear of the Kempei.

Office Soldiers:

The distinctive mark for these soldiers is the white band on the back of their hats. These soldiers, enlisted men from the ranks of Superior Private to Sgt. Major, are young and brilliant fellows who work for staff officers.

Japanese Nurses:

Dr. BRAUN stated that he heard several Japanese make the remark that they had nurses at both Wewak and Hollandia. However, Dr. BRAUN did not see any Japanese Nurses.

Japanese Geisha Girls:

A Japanese officer said that there was a Geisha House at Wewak. Also, that the Japanese were planning to build one at Alexishafen. While at Manam, Dr. BRAUN heard that the Japanese maintained a Geisha House near Rabaul.

Japanese Brothels:

At Manam, Dr. BRAUN heard a Japanese officer remark that they maintained a brothel at Rabaul.

Miscellaneous:

Dr. BRAUN was told by a Japanese officer that they still held it against the Germans for the statement made by the Kaiser regarding the "Yellow Peril." Furthermore, the Japanese know of Haushofer and his Geopolitics. They have expressed a dislike for him too.

According to Dr. BRAUN, it was the will of the Japanese officers that the German missionaries get better treatment than the others. But actually, the Japanese common soldier treated all alike, generally speaking.

Some Observations & Conclusions Regarding Medical & Dental Care of the Japanese Troops in New Guinea 1943-1944

By Dr. Theodore Braun, Evacuee from Hollandia

My first contact with Japanese Army medicine was with the first group we met, "Totori" who were labeled as "famous and ruthless", veterans of the Central China and Malayan Campaigns. Their clothing needed repairs. The medical officer was gruff and barbaric with his men. For minor surgical work on enlisted men he made no attempts at sterility or asepsis. For officers he boiled and sterilized harder and more than seemed necessary to me.

I was ordered to help with the dispensary treatment of the soldiers and it only took a few days and Nishijima San, the medical officer (1st Lieut), had only very few patients at sick call in the morning. The soldiers came around later and asked me to treat them because, as they explained in their middle school English "You have much kindness." A captain of an Infantry unit came around, and not through "channels" asked me if I would perform a hemorrhoidectomy on him. When I told him that they certainly had surgeons and hospitals he told me through his interpreter "no Japanese Army surgeon was going to perform an operation of election on him. An operation in Kobe or Tokyo, yes. But in the Army, never."

The Japanese at first did not value the hospital as a unit, or care for the medical supplies as such. Uncut bails of gauze were made into mosquito nets for the officers (they had green ones, but felt white ones were more becoming to their rank). Japanese medical officers dished out surgical equipment to soldiers who were not medics, for the asking. The Japanese M.D.'s stole all my books dealing with tropical medicine in spite of sneers that we Americans were behind the time medically.

Though they told us Amele would remain a Japanese Army base, the latrine the officers used was soon filthy and the whole grounds became polluted with Japanese feces. I put in more effort at sanitary policing than the Japanese officer in charge.

In treatment, the higher rank preceded the lower. They had many dental cavities and ordered me to start fixing soldiers' teeth. If a private sat in the chair and a non-commissioned soldier would come in the enlisted man would get up even if I was just ready to put in the filling. In like manner a Sgt. Major would jump out of the chair for a Lieutenant.

The first cases of scabies contracted in New Guinea were not recognized by the Japanese. I counted one medical officer and 14 non-coms among the medics who seemingly knew of Noguchi as the "greatest bacteriologist who ever lived."

Naturally, from these experiences I had with them during the first weeks I formed certain deductions. I did not change them during the entire sixteen months I spent with them though I tried to remain objective.

I did not get to know any Japanese doctors intimately. They tried to show their disdain for the white man and they succeeded. From the fighter pilot who, it was claimed, had four Fortresses to his credit, who was the idol of all Japanese soldiers, and who also tried to see if I would jump when he fired a pistol behind my back (I didn't), down to the M.C. of a commissary battalion who said "Tcha" in amazement when he saw me powder sulfa tablets and strew it in an open wound.


Although I felt certain that the white wound salve some Japanese commands use is a sulfa salve, I inquired and found that the Japanese enlisted men did not know of it.

Medical intelligence was not spread from division to division though they were staged in adjacent areas. Intelligence as to the prevalence of leprosy in a certain area was not passed on to the next group. I saw one Japanese medical officer miss an outspoken case of neural leprosy.

The attitude of a Japanese medical officer to his patients was that of the superior officer to low ranking beings in general. With the exception of one anti-aircraft medical officer whose interest extended even to the local natives I saw no sign of attachment of medical officers to their enlisted men, although it is by no means uncommon to see it in other junior officers.

Their attitude toward injured personnel who might become cripples is this. A cripple will become a burden to the emperor, so it is better if he die. I heard this from medical officers and from enlisted men repeatedly. One time I reported a Japanese three star private with mitral regurgitation. I suspect tuberculosis patients were hurriedly evacuated though. I was told that he would die anyway and might just as well die in the army. He was not relieved. Also, one non-com, Kaboyasi (?) whose father had been a liberal cabinet member and who I was told would be an officer if his father had a "clean record", received braces for some orthopedic ailment. He, however, was not sent home. Toward wounded men they acted callous.

I met some M.D.'s who were interested in medical research. Some wrote to me to get information on "scrub-typhus" or "Akakamushi" fever. One rather despondent professor of Otloryngology of the Imperial University of Tokyo who was attached to a line regiment told me he could do nothing in his specialty as he did not even have a laryngal mirror. He had very little equipment to treat his men, had come upon a set of tuning forks (probably mine) and to pass his time was checking up on the pitch of relative deafness inherent to malaria in soldiers who had failed to take malaria suppressives, and that due to quinine and massive atebrine therapy. His results were:



X -- deafness due to malaria

Y - deafness due to atebrine therapy and quinine

I was told they had some research groups in the East Indies. However, the research minded Japanese was a rare bird.

Many up to the rank of 1st Lieutenant had not finished their medical course and the Japanese Universities were giving out diplomas to men after a certain length of service and for a thesis on some medical subject. The Japanese tried not to give me any information on new remedies. One had tried to tell me something once and was stopped by an Intelligence Officer. They felt, however, that in a quinine Urethane Cum Caffeine compound in ampules called "Bagnon", they had achieved wonders in malaria therapy. The soldiers were not very fond of it though.

The Japanese showed by their attitude that I was to feel inferior because of my race. Toward us as a group they were uninterested. It was only when I told them I had no more remedies to treat their dispensary cases that I got a few medical supplies.

The Japanese soldier, however, was not so convinced that the "white doctor" was inferior. At Hollandia they passed a Japanese medical station to get me to treat an anti-aircraft soldier. They felt that their nurses were far superior to ours, and for some reason much more patriotic. I never saw any. Neither did I ever see a hospital in operation. Some of the smaller ones had three or four medical men. They used existing mission houses, native huts, etc. at times as their hospitals.

Diseases which affected the Japanese troops in great numbers were:

Dengue--for which they had the same treatment as we have.
Dysentery--for which they took no prophylactic measures. They had some "creosote pills" which were quite efficient in cases of mucous diarrhea. The soldiers were isolated in huts uncared for, and I heard they had many deaths due to it (Hansa Bay and Madang areas).
Skin infections--mainly scabies, tinea circinata and infected ulcers. At first they had no large supplies of anti-scabetic remedies. Later they had it in profusion.
Malaria--there was relatively little except among landing barge soldiers who found putting up mosquito bars too inconvenient and who told me they didn't like anti-malarial drugs.

Taking of anti-malarial remedies was left to the soldiers. They took 0.2 grams quinine daily and on every tenth day three doses of atebrine. (4 or 6 tablets during the day). They were supposed to take plasmoquinine every two months but I could find none who admitted of having taken it. Their dental care was poor. Very many bad carious cavities which were temporarily filled with "carbol-eugenol" and gutta percha in Palau on their way to New Guinea. In answer to the question "have you no dentists" the usual answer was "Arimasen" or "there are none." However, I heard of four separate ones among representatives of what I guessed were 50,000 Japanese troops. The average Japanese M.D. feels it much below his dignity to even extract a loose stump. Many gold crowns are pre-war and were put over sound teeth for the beauty of it.

Contrary to what might be thought their dietary precautions were good. Their meat allowance was to be half a pound a day per man. And in Hollandia they got it. There was variety of meats or fish, dehydrated vegetables, salted fruits, candy, and biscuits. Any soldier who did not get green vegetables was to take 15 yeast tablets daily. The enlisted man did not like the taste and usually threw them away, though they were issued. All troops were asked to grow silver beets as vegetables if they remained long at any place and there were gardeners who inspected the gardens.

The medical equipment was good. The drugs and supplies of gauze was of high grade. Often time the quantities the troops had at their disposal were small. They had great faith in aeriflavin impregnated gauze. There was also a pink gauze which I could not identify.

During the early part of the war some medical officers were gleeful that the Americans had no quinine and apparently no atebrine. "Now we", they would tell me, "could fight a tropical war even without Java in our possession since we have much atebrine."

They had great faith in intravenous calcium therapy. Feeling, as I understood them, that it would increase their manly potence. Where they were to use it I don't know, as they were terrified lest their venereal disease would be discovered. As the death penalty was threatened for rape in New Guinea. Even Kempeis told me never to report a soldier with V.D. and they are no soft boys by any means if it comes to punishing soldiers.

The most astounding thing to me was their failure to provide anti-septics for their latrines either cresol or chlorinated lime. The slit latrines were always fouled, and every place surrounding their camps showed feces in the most unexpected places. I saw several half-hearted attempts to dig latrines but the urgency for that did not seem as great as for deep shelters against our strafing raids. Though they had dysentery deaths right along, they were just too lazy.

The troops wasted bandages. (They were saving in the use of adhesive tape though for some reason unknown to me). And their issues of salves, drugs, etc. were soon filthy. They had had rather extensive drill in first aid for fractures, wounds and hemorrhage but apparently none in asepsis. However, any epidemic of colds was productive of bringing out many Japanese soldiers with gauze masks, often put on in a most ineffective manner.

Undoubtedly their larger base hospitals were run along different lines. However, I never saw them.

There are men in the Japanese army, Shinto-Jingoists, who feel Western medicine is not proper for the Japanese. The Japanese medical profession would have to be taught a sharp lesson some day for ignoring the virtues of Japanese earths, herbs and waters. Much of this type of drug, put up in good packings and bottles, was distributed among troops to cure them of pulmonary or any other ailments with Japanese drugs for Japanese patent remedies. One adherent of this line of thought had quite an extensive practice of his own. I met non-coms and junior officers who looked upon him as medical authority for internal diseases. I was told an influential man who was touring China at the time was a chief manufacturer of this type of drug. And there was hope that they would soon become army issue. To me Japanese medical officers sneered at the remedies but one recognized one, "radiola" for lung and liver disease by the shake of the bottle.

In summary, I feel they had more equipment and knowledge at their disposal than they made use of. They are lethargic; when not in actual combat they are lazy if no one on top cracks the whip. It was not only the case that they all figured on dying in New Guinea. They were the same way when they thought they would have victory in a few months time.

Some Observations & Conclusions Regarding The New Guinea Natives under Japanese Military Domination in 1943-44

By Dr. Theodore Braun, Evacuee from Hollandia

Before the Japanese came to the Madang area the Japanese were expected in spite of a speech by the current Madang District Officer to the assembled Luluais and Tultuls, telling them that the flag flying on the mast would never be taken down. The thing was in the air. When the Japanese had landed in more distant parts of New Guinea, native laborers from Rabaul and the goldfields area came through to Madang, telling of how the Japanese stole pigs and chickens, and how many of them had worked without pay.

Those adhering to mission societies of course, knew that the Japanese were heathen and those of our mission had been told of Sun and Emperor worship, and attention was drawn to the parallel of that and the Emperor worship insisted upon by the Roman Emperors of apostolic times. Professed heathen cautiously expressed the view that the ancestors might be coming. Among these men were some leaders appointed by the authorities to offset too great " mission influence". In general, the attitude was one of expectant waiting and the feeling that hard times were ahead. Some dissatisfaction had been created by some, by no means all, members of the NGVR, later ANGAU, because of forcing natives to carry and work without pay and preventing urgent field work, and because the natives had to provide food for the native women in the camp held by whites and native constabulary who did not raise a finger to work. They expected nothing better from the Japanese, but they were disgusted by the prospects of war in New Guinea.

I. THE JAPANESE APPROACH

In Madang and the Gum River the Japanese landed with dramatic suddenness. And before 15 hours were up, the natives came to Amele (12 miles) and told us that they had landed. Some had been grabbed to carry cargo from the beach. One man who had stumbled on to a group of invaders had been tied to a tree for the night. The first chickens and pigs seen were immediately slaughtered, and that without as much as a thank you. There were none who could speak pidgin English and communication was difficult, we were told. Their popularity was like that of a man who would steal half the pigs of an Iowa farmer. This was before the first day was up.

The natives were in part left alone. In part rounded up by Japanese soldiers who motioned gestures and were able to say: "Hu, Hu." Villages where the Japanese had not been to yet, started eating their own pigs and killing chickens. (For some reason unknown to me, the Japanese does not like to eat roosters and the natives had even heard that from Rabaul escapees.).

Before many days other reports came in that missionaries were tied up and marched around for the delight of Japanese troops. In our hospital we started moving drugs and equipment out for the use of the native population. We told them that it was our duty to stay even in the face of danger as there had been no order for us to leave. (We had also expected our native evangalists to remain at their posts among wild tribes at the danger of their own lives and they had usually done so.) We hoped to help save the white man's face. Upon leaving Madang the District Officer had told the natives that he would be back within two months time, a remark we were reminded of months later by the natives. When a native managed to steal a few words with us, the natives expressed worry. Except for plundering of their property and forced labor without pay, they were not mistreated. In isolated instances some officers checked their soldiers from entering houses. This was the general situation in the Madang area.

In the Finschhafen area the natives I talked to during my stay there, reported a similar reception with less forced labor than in Madang.

In Hollandia most local natives had left. They were forbidden to communicate or hold traffic with us. In addition, we understood no Malayan pidgin. However, while discussing the empty native huts, Nishira, our interpreter, told us that the bulk of the natives had fled to the hills and behind the swamp areas soon after the first Japanese patrols landed. That they had contacted those of several villages where they had congregated relatively recently. He gave the names of six groups, the names of which I cannot remember any more. (For my benefit he also told me there were military guards on the roads). The population apparently was less (except in the Lake Centani direction) than in the Madang region. There was forced labor from Vanimo and other places along the Aitape coast line to fill their need for manual labor.

II. NATIVE GOVERNMENT

MADANG--At first no effort was made to do much of anything. The natives were summoned together and told they must supply food; that this was war and they had no time to pay. Any Japanese officer or even soldier would grab a native and say: "Boy, Boy" and gesture as to what he wanted. Even after several months there were no piggin speaking Japanese in the Madang area as far as the natives I could contact knew.

Several months later I was told by Japanese intelligence officers that they had decided to leave the old Luluais and Tultuls in charge, that they were in part fine men, some others were passable and that they contemplated no marked changes. However, they tried to contact Christian leaders also and tried to placate them by telling them that we might be released at some future date. Most of them told us they doubted that. Though I heard they had got the Umum natives to build a house for them on the promise it was for my wife and me.

Some natives who understood the jargon they spoke more readily, were appointed as interpreters. So that up to September 1943 there were no new leaders in the Madang area.

The two older of my native medical assistants had been giving anti-yaws treatment and were doing minor surgery in hiding. As things got "hot" they reported to some Japanese authorities and after inspection by Japanese medics they were allowed to continue their work and at first were allowed to go into the hinterland of Nobonob, the islands before Madang, the Keku territory.

At first control of native affairs was given to interpreters of detachments stationed in the particular areas. After some time "office soldiers" from the Intelligence took charge. From about June 1943 on the Madang area natives were all put under Kempei jurisdiction only. The Japanese did not meddle in native squabbles in regard to marriage and other difficulties but let them settle their own internal affairs.

FINSCHHAFEN--Did not ask. Presumably similar to Madang.

MANAM--Similar to Madang. However, the Kempeis came much sooner. The Luluais were held responsible. Tultuls were aided by other men who were slapped and kicked about, or tied up for a few days. Then, sometimes, they were disposed and others got the interpreter's armband, or whatever it was that they represented. The Japanese called all village officials Captains and tried to make the natives believe that we had committed wrong by not addressing them as mister.

HOLLANDIA--Do not know. The Malayans seemed to be used as liaison men to some degree. It was noticeable though that the Constabulary had retained the right to wear a bush knife and a shotgun (may have been for hunting game). The Madang Constabulary was not trusted to that degree.

III. RECRUITING OF NATIVE LABOR

The Japanese at first simply rounded up men where they found them and under threats with a bayonet forced them to shoulder packs. They threatened them that older men would be responsible. They went to the clumsy expedient of putting cloth bands around the victims arms, which the young men tore off and threw away. Later the Japanese marked the natives with indelible dyes such as violet. And if the Japanese said that 20 boys must be forthcoming, there was no choice.

In some places officers of some detachments would take the village roll book away. The next group that came had no censor's list. Those natives who lived along the roadway who were used most, were forced to work continually at first. Later on friends from adjoining areas tried to help out to prevent those so exposed from starvation due to lack of field work. There was no recruiting. The Japanese employed a native police boy from O-U village. He told us that he didn't want to work for them but that he had to. We told him that we could not help him out either and that we felt sure the Australians would understand his dilemma. That was before the natives had any indication which way the war would turn out. Talking with another native from Siar who was forced to be a messenger boy at Amron for the Kempeis told me that Mr. Oakley had promised to be back in two months. And now they were dropping leaflets which stated that those who worked for the Japanese would be punished. But the natives had to work for the Australians when they often times did not like it. And the same reasons which forced them then were forcing them now and the native thought the Australian officials should know enough about New Guinea to realize it. The natives wanted to get away from the islands but got no permission. Natives made disrespectful grimmaces at the Japanese when they were not looking to show us their contempt. Also at Amele, Gragat, Siar, Manam and Hansa Bay. And even an armed native constable in Hollandia did that while the Japanese was not looking.

The administrative set-up in the Madang area was that some Japanese would sit in a native village, learn pidgin or improve that which he had learned in the pidgin school, and through conversation find out everything he possibly could of the natives thoughts, likes and dislikes. They feigned consternation if some officer or non-com stole something or chopped down a fruit tree or robbed the tobacco crop and say the big Captain would punish the evil-doer. They were not ashamed to beg or steal. The natives knew they were liars.

These men received their orders from higher up. Further details I was not able to elicit as both we and the natives were threatened dire punishment if caught in conversation. We were forbidden to speak native vernacular languages. A Japanese was to overhear every conversation. But at times we managed. The Japanese used the threat of killing us if we did not obey their will. These threats were made on Ragetta, Siar and also Manam Island.

IV. NATIVE LABOR CONDITIONS

In the Madang area during the period of our confinement there, all the labor was forced. The Japanese came to different villages and would demand so and so many hands, or else. The elder people and those concerned could but try to put up a just selection. Even in instances where natives were cook boys, they were forced into it. One native of Gragat was elected for the job just because a Japanese interpreter stumbled onto the discovery that he held that post for Mr. Radke (one of the men of our mission). After several months time the natives were paid in invasion money at the end of the week or two weekly periods. They, however, could buy nothing for it after the loin cloths at the former mission stations had been dished out. At that, we had told the natives that anything which they could filch off from our stations, such as kerosene, matches, nails, clothing, knives, etc.,

were theirs. We had come to serve them and not the Japanese. At one time a native offered me a handful of invasion money, asking me if we could do something with it. We accepted and tried but had the same luck as the natives. The next time I told a native who offered me of the money to use it as toilet paper instead of wakao leaves. In Manam Island also we (protestants) were offered a handful of invasion money. The native offering it told us they could only buy soap for it. No food, no cloth material and no matches. Although through Japanese soldiers (privates) they became acquainted with them and were able to barter for tin food, cigarettes and at times the Japanese soldiers would accept invasion money, but preferred Australian coins.

I, personally, heard no one native who had volunteered his employment in the Madang or Manum area, and I have asked specifically about that.

The natives were forced to run errands, sail canoes, unload craft, especially to cut kunai grass from runways or landing strips, dig air raid shelters for the Japanese, and cut roads. At one time they cut the grass in Madang town and built huts for the Japanese on the statement that they had done that for the Australians too and plant gardens.

Labor had been rounded up from places as far as Megiman. One thousand boys from Karkar Island had been driven together to work at Amron and vicinity. They were always in danger of our bombing raids.

Food was brought by the natives who worked without payment from Karkar to Madang. (They were allowed to barter some native leaf tobacco with their mainland friends). Usually the village supplying the labor had to supply the food for the absentee workers and in addition supplement the food of Japanese posts stationed at or near the villages. While at Manam some boys were told to go and provision themselves for a three week's stay at the airstrip at Hansa. Due to lack of barges the Japanese kept them four weeks, but gave them no food. Some of the native boys told us they begged Japanese soldiers who were throwing away half kerosene tins full of rice into the sea for the rice. But they were chased off and told cocoanuts were food for "New Guinea boy."

The Japanese soldier is lazy and the natives made full use of that. And they sat down too. As they were getting nothing of value in return they loafed on jobs where there was no great danger of death from our planes. Occasionally, the Japanese handed out cigarettes to the natives. Most of them were of Malayan variety; however, occasionally, there was an American brand of cigarettes included. It is presumed that they were plundered from the Philippine Islands. In carrying cargo, however, the natives were annoyed by the frequent rest periods of the military guards as the New Guinea-ite likes to carry long stretches at a relatively fast rate, in order to get the thing over with.

Clothing was given rarely and sporadically for services in labor or for invasion currency. More astute Japanese who were desirous of winning native confidence were responsible for that. However, there were no stores. Appointees as constabulary were dressed in khaki with red trimmings. And their salute was returned by a salute or bow. Shelters the natives had to build themselves throughout. There were no attempts at sanitation enforced.

Medical treatment was not furnished. I know of one case where a medical officer of an anti-aircraft battery on Mililat cared for the natives medically. They allowed my former medical assistants to carry on work but I was told the Japanese were continually commandeering their meager supplies of mercurochrome, etc., and that they estimated by Christmas 1943 they would have to discontinue work.

Natives wounded in air raids in Japanese infested villages received first aid. There was no hospitalization. Vanimo natives working for the Japanese were left to die or get well in isolation huts built by their fellow laborers without any medical attention whatever.

Naturally, the Japanese could not trust labor kept that way. They took a lot of verbal insults from the natives. If the natives got too deep into their hides they were thrown around with judo grips and holds, tied up and beaten. Kempeis dealt out slaps in the face frequently. The Japanese would usually take statements from the natives like "Du long long man tru." (you are truly crazy) with a silly smile.

There was no uniform time schedule, there were no uniform laws, only the uniform manner of exploitation and the ill-hidden surprise at the fact that they were not treated as liberators. That was the attitude of the average Japanese enlisted man.

V. NATIVE ATTITUDE

My impression is that the bulk of the native population had planned to be indifferent. After all, the adults had been German, then Australian subjects in their own life time without having been asked pro or con. They knew the white man and were rather timorous of trading him for an unknown master of the yellow race. Many Chinamen had been liked, but had not received much respect from the former whites.

Among the heathen, those who for various reasons refused the Christian message some had for years, as far back as 1930 at least, been waiting for a return of the ancestors who would see to the just distribution of the gifts the white man was arrogating for himself. As stated before, some of those men who while they had the highest confidence of the authorities had kept their views to themselves and their friends fairly well. Naturally they were anxious to see if their concept of a millenium would not be brought about (Millenianism or Chiliasm was in the dogma of only one small group of missionaries operating in New Guinea and was contra to the teaching of most. So it was not a perverted concept carried over from the missionaries).

The first hostile reaction toward the Japanese I observed was at our confinement. The second was when Mr. Dott and Wenz disappeared. Most of the natives broke away and said: If they kill our missionaries we won't work for them. All were disgusted at the thievery, lack of organization, and stupidity in bushcraft, etc. of the typical Japanese. Also, about their filthiness (though they themselves are not too virtuous in that line).

As we found out, even the heathen felt sorry for us who were interned. When one of our planes crashed a Major, Captain (?), and a Sgt. Maj. were picked up by Pai Island natives; they told the flyers there was no possibility of escape but they urged them to eat all the native food they could get down. The natives told them that they would be very hungry soon. A few minutes later Kempeis came to the island to pick them up.

Since the Japanese talked so much about America and even Australians and the Germans in our camp were labeled as such, natives talking to us expected confidently that the "America man" would liberate them.

The native did not dare to show open hostility. However, the people of the Keku-Bogadjim territory fled into the uninhabited bush country east of the Mindjim river. They were the only ones in the Madang area able to do so for geographical reasons. The Gragat and

Siar islanders begged to be allowed to go to the mainland but were refused gruffly. The Kempeis told me that *similar cases happened in Finschhafen*. We were responsible. However, one Intelligence Lt. Col. admitted that the Dott, Wenz affair may have had something to do with it. Since the Amele natives were causing trouble in regard to Welch, my wife and me, a native Saik, from Ageru was allowed to view us. When he saw our haggard faces he cried and was rushed off by guards and that was the last of that.

In Manam the natives were unable to get away. However, near Bogia I was told some villages had cleared out. There were only a half dozen or so Japanese at our camp and three or four Manam men who came to the bush to talk to us told us in case of a sudden American landing they would take care of the few Japanese before an American ever got a chance to do so.

In Hollandia I just heard from the interpreter that the natives had fled early in the war.

The native weighed his experiences with white and yellow and found the Japanese wanting, only that their women were unmolested up to the time we left Madang and Manam was in the Japanese favor.

I heard of no cases of natives spying for the Japanese. I did hear though that police boys who had gone home (nostalgia) from the Wahgi-Mt. Hagen area had spilled valuable information. One Rabaul Police Boy was captured by the Japanese and confined with the Siar people. He told us he was not particularly ill treated. The Kempeis one time complained that the natives did not work for them as freely as for the white man. I could not say there were none who spied for them. But I am certain that there were indeed very, very few from the Madang area up to the time we left. Not knowing the Manams well we were not certain but I doubt if they had any spies from there. Father Lutmer, who unfortunately was killed on the transport ship, said there were some. On what basis I do not know. He had some freedom of traveling in the territory.

VI. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA AND EDUCATION

The general line was that they were brothers, much closer to them than the white. That did not make much impression, and they accused one of our men that the natives nearly worshipped him. They tackled the religious issues cautiously and where they felt the Christian sentiment was strong allowed baptisms. They forbade village schools in native language though, and made half-hearted attempts at Japanese schools. Japanese interpreters were usually the school instructors. However, the Japanese had inspectors who checked on the progress of the new schools. Only children attended the schools. In places like Kauris, the Siars told us, where the village as such had rejected Christianity, Sun worship was instituted. We told the Siars that that probably hung together with their ancestor returning hopes.

The Japanese wormed out stories of bad deeds in behavior of former white residents and dwelt upon them. And some tried to ingratiate themselves with talking companionship, less forced labor, with certain leading natives. That is all I heard about either in Madang or Manam.

In the Finschhafen area I believe it was the same.

In Hollandia it appeared to me (no proof, however) that they courted the favor of the Malayans rather than that of the native population.

In regard to our own pamphlet propaganda the natives regretted the lack of understanding to their plight. (I heard this from the Madang natives).

VII. NATIVE MORALE

They felt depressed and feared actual battle in their area. Many at least did not think the Japanese would hold the territory. It was dangerous for us to be too inquisitive as inadvertantly our conversation might leak out.

The Japanese wherever we were did nothing for native recreation. Of course they were ordered to dance at the whim of every Japanese officer. I was told that was first done for them in the Cape Croiselles region by some natives who sought to curry Japanese favor and appeasement. The Japanese liked it and sometimes gave rice in return. There were no movies or other type of entertainment. They promised brothels the time they once got well established in New Guinea.

VIII. NATIVE PERSONALITIES

One native was ever mentioned to me as seeking out the Japanese and offering to work for them. That was TAGALOF, better known as Magis of Mirjuk. Formerly a chief native confident of the District Officer, Mr. Oakly. For years this native had been promising better times, when the ancestors or at least their "cargo" came. He had quite a following in the Kauris village where sun worship was started.

No natives volunteered as guides to Amele, or Amele to Keku, Amele to Belin. The Japanese seized some boy and told him; "go, go, Keku go" and threatened with bayonet.

GULUMAN of Gragat (Luluai) worked with the Japanese but by the expression on his face, he was not very happy. He would not risk speaking to us. I presume he was under pressure.

KASAU (Luluai) of Bilibil worked for the Japanese and led them to the Pai Coast. He also was a "cargo from ancesters" man and always curried favor of those in power. However, I think he always showed a sense for the welfare of his village and was in all probability under some pressure. He did not seem happy the time I saw him.

A former police boy from O-U (forgot his name) who was told he would be brought home from dangerous Rabaul bombing to safe Madang for doing constabulary work. He was able to speak to Welsch and me and apologized to us for working for the Japanese.

ALOIS of Siar was forced to do liaison work (native to Japanese officials) and act as errand boy.

I have forgotten the names of others at Manam in similar situations as those in Madang.

As definitely hostile to the Japanese, I heard no names. Some of the Tultuls and Luluais of the Keku area were denounced as such. They ran away when called to second meeting. One, an elderly Luluai who was also Christian elder, and Guenas Luluai in the same area were mentioned by name.

Finschhafen and Pai Coast natives were roundly denounced by the Japanese.

Of the Hollandia area I know nothing except that the Japanese did not trust them.

The Japanese also reported attacks on their patrols, probably banana stealing ones, in the Adelbert mountain foothills.

IX. GENERAL

Mr. S. Horaguchi told me once in a despondent mood: "We (Japanese) are making the same mistakes in New Guinea as in Formosa, Korea, and Manchukuo. The natives hate us. The work of months to gain their confidence can be undone in a few days by the wrong men."