

SECRET

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

by authority of the
Commanding General
Y-Force Operations Staff

17 September 1944 *AN*.

No. 63

FROM: 10 Sept 44 - 0001z

TO : 16 Sept 44 - 2400z

Hq, Y-Force AN/KW
AFU 627

17 September 1944 - 1200z

MAPS: ASIA, 1:1,000,000; BURMA (Survey of India) and WESTERN YUNNAN, 1:253,440.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

b. Defensive Organization.- Troops which have withdrawn from the road-block area S to MANGSHIH are reported to have been observed building defenses to the E and NE of MANGSHIH. (Fld Hq, 16 Sept, unrated).

c. Units in contact.- The 33d Army Hq is now located at HSENWI rather than at MANGSHIH as previously reported. According to a report of the 10th, 18th Div Hq is now located at MUSE. (Delhi, 10 Sept, B-2). A POW captured in the road-block area was said to be from the 9th Co, 3d Bn, 16th Regt, 2d Div, and made the following statements: CHANG CHING SHAN, NANTHENPO, TUNG KUO YUEN area (road-block area) is occupied by elements of the 16th Regt. Elements of all three regts of the 2d Div are in the road-block area. (XI G/A, 11 Sept, F-0). Additional interrogations of POWs have also indicated that elements of all three regts of the 2d Div are now in the MANGSHIH - LUNGLING area. Two POWs from the 10th Co, 3d Bn, 16th Regt, have been briefly interrogated. The first, a superior private, said he knew code numbers of the 16th and 29th Regts but not the 4th. He also stated that Div Hq was near and N of MANGSHIH. According to him, the 2d Div is suffering heavy casualties and they are being evacuated to the 2d Div Field Hospital in MANGSHIH. The POW added further that elements of the 29th Regt as well as an "OKAMI" Inf Unit were in the road-block area. He gave the following commanders' names:

Div Commander
Regt Commander
Bn Commander

OKASAKI, SESABURO
SADAYI, KICHISHI
SATO

A Brig General was listed as YIWAYI, TORAJIRO. (The Regt Commander is reported to have been killed by arty fire and the 3d Bn Commander is said to be in command of the Regt at present.) (XI G/A & CEF, 13-14 Sept, F-2).

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The second POW agreed with the first except that the Regt Commander was only wounded. A document captured in the same area, W of LUNG-LING, listed strength of the 16th Regt (2 Bns) in this area at 1,083 and listed 76 casualties. (Document undated) (XI G/A, 14 Sept, B-2). The Sino 9th Div captured 2 POWs, one of whom died of wounds, and the second stated he was from the ISAMU "1302" Unit (16th Regt) and that the regt and Div commanders were both at MANGSHIH. (Crf, 12 Sept, F-2). Captured maps and an order dated the 10th Sept indicated the disposition of the 1st and 3d Bns of the 16th Regt, and showed that the objective of any of the garrisons at SAIKUANGPO, LAOTUNGPO, HUAPPO, & CHANGCHINGSHAN is the double bridge in LUNG-LING. Some of the documents belonged to a Company Commander (now dead). Pamphlets describing American and British combat methods were also discovered. (XI G/A, 13 Sept, B-2).

9. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention. -
NANSHAN.

There are said to be 16,000 troops in the area/BIAN CHANG-LING. MANGSHIH. (Combo, and British, 10 Sept, B-2). A Japanese corporal (from the bomber shot down near TENGCHUNG) said the special 21st regt was coming to reinforce LUNG-LING. Note: The 21st Regt is part of the 5th Div, currently carried in the SW PACIFIC. This may be a composite made up of the 2,000 out of the 21st Div, reported to have come from FIC to reinforce the IMPAL area. Such a unit may be involved in the current movement of reinforcements northward from MANDALAY (but without confirmation). The POW also stated that there were 60 planes now based at BIAMU. (54th Army, 12 Sept, F-4). A tank observer saw approximately 150 trucks arrive in MANGSHIH between 1915 hrs and 2000 hrs on the 13th of Sept. At 2154 hrs, an additional 150 trucks arrived, and at 0300 hrs, 14th Sept, the trucks started on a return trip S. (XI G/A, 13 & 14 Sept, B-2). The 54th Army reported that a Sino agent having just returned from BIAMU, on the 12th of Sept, stated that on 3d Sept, 1,500 Japs were stationed there. They wore "18 B" on their cotton tabs. (Note: According to Chungking, this is the first time that any such insignia has appeared in the area. Further information is being sought. (Crf, 14 Sept, F-2). 800 ill-clothed troops in poor condition, about half of them armed, went from BIAMU, thru NALAM (SU 2674), headed for NANSHAN. These may be elements of the 18th Div from NALAM. (Shaduzup, 14 Sept, B-2).

2. BRITISH OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

a. General Summary. -

TENGCHUNG: TENGCHUNG fell at 1000 hrs on September 14, after having had its garrison compressed into two small areas during the previous three days, one a strongpoint on and in the SE wall and the other, a village outside the E corner of the town.

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30 - 40 escaped to outlying villages, many of whom were tracked down and killed

LUNGLING AREA: The enemy forces were on the offensive practically throughout the entire week, continuing to exploit the success gained by the end of last week. They concentrated most of their activity in the NANCHANG and SAN KUAN PO area and had attained considerable success in each area by the 15th. However, commencing that date, for some undetermined reason, they began a withdrawal. They withdrew from the high ground N of LUNGLING including old LUNGLING and NANCHANG; this force is reported to have withdrawn W of LUNGLING back to the road-block area S of the town on the road. At the same time, the garrison holding SAN KUAN PO withdrew most of its force with the exception of a few with automatic weapons to act as rear-guard. Besides the withdrawals from these areas, the Japs withdrew a column of approximately 600 from the road-block area S to MANGSHIH. Some of this group were caught in artillery fire and approximately 100 were killed. The remainder made their way into MANGSHIH and started constructing defensive positions E and NE of the town.

A captured map shows that the Japanese operational plan is to send one column E from the road-block area, as diversionary to draw the Chinese away from LUNGLING, thus prevent the 71st and 2d Armies from joining. A second column is to move NW around the city to the N, circling and join hands with a third force at MENGLIENPO (just E of LUNGLING). The third column is to proceed to MENGLIENPO via SHUANGPO, HUAPU and SAN KUAN PO and LAO TUNG PO. (XI G/A, 14 Sept, B-2).

MANGSHIH: Activity in the MANGSHIH area again centered around TUNG KUO YUEN (4 miles NE/MANGSHIH) where there were several local attacks by both Jap and Sino forces without any change in position.

b. Operations of component elements.-

(4) Artillery: Sinos say that the Japs fired 3,000 rds of arty ammo from 10 guns in the vicinity of NANTSIEMEN on KUOTI-LANG (vicinity of SAN KUAN PO) before it was taken. (CSP, 14 Sept, C-2).

(5) Combat aviation: 3 light bombers and 7 Zeros attacked SHUANGTSAOPA at 101400, wounding 2 and killing 3 Chinese soldiers; no other damage reported. (XI G/A, 10 Sept, B-2). Jap air attack on truckhead on the 11th killed 6 and wounded 6 Chinese soldiers, killed 16 horses and damaged 3 trucks. (XI G/A, 11 Sept, B-2).

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3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Enemy casualties.- It is reported that 2,600 Japs were killed in TENGCHUNG, including 50 officers. 50 prisoners - officers and men - plus 13 women were taken. (J-1 Hq, 14 Sept). It was later reported that 600 were counted dead in TENGCHUNG. (CEF, 14 Sept, C-3). A Capt SATO was reported killed in a skirmish NE of MANGSHIH. (CEF, 14 Sept, C-3). Approximately 800 - 900 additional Jap casualties have been reported during the week in addition to the above mentioned TENGCHUNG figures.

In MANGSHIH, there was reported to be 1,000 wounded; and a Jap General officer was reported to have been killed in MANGSHIH; no report as to how or when. (C-3).

c. Supply and equipment.- During operations on the 11th, the following was captured in TENGCHUNG: 7 rubber boats, 2 radio sets, 3 MG's, 5 knee mortars and 62 rifles. (CEF, 11 Sept, C-3). The following equipment dropped to the Jap forces were recovered by the Chinese: 8 radio batteries, 60 black handled hand-grenades, 196 white handled hand-grenades, and 120 rifle grenade fuses. (AA G/A, 11 Sept, C-2).

A document captured at HUAPU is said to give the supply plan for the 2d Div for period beginning Sept 7th. This document is being forwarded to CEF. (CEF, 12 Sept, C-2). At HUAPU, the following material was captured: 3 knee mortars, 1 large mortar, 20 rifles, 3 Bren guns and some grenades. (AI G/A, 12 Sept, B-2). Also at HUAPU, the following was captured: 2 swords, 2 HMG's, 2 LMG's, one large and one knee mortar and 30 rifles.

d. Terrain not under our control.- The road between MANHAI (SN 9193) and SIKAW (SN 8858) is not in use because of a bridge being out N of SIKAW. (Shaduzup, 11 Sept, C-2).

e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation.- Radio TOKYO announced in an English broadcast at 1200 hrs, 15 Sept, that the Chinese 28th Div had been reduced to the strength of one company (A-1). (This report coincides with Chinese reports).

g. Intelligence not covered above.- A POW, taken in TENGCHUNG, who was a Korean interpreter stated: On the night of 10th to 11th Sept, Japs were planning to break out of the city and moved to a small village at SE 4113. He also said that 40 Jap planes with parachutists were to arrive at TENGCHUNG by 12 Sept. (116th Div, 10 Sept, F-4). A captured Jap document described Japanese patrols as follows: Patrol leader carries a can of phosphorous paint and a bottle of germs; the remaining 4 men are divided into 2 two-man sections. In each section, one man is armed with an LMG or carbine, and the other is armed with a bolo knife and a rope. (AI G/A, 14 Sept, B-0).

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4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES: Following is an estimate of the situation prepared by Fld Hq, Y-FOS, JT/16 Sept:

(1) Summary of enemy situation.

a. Enemy activity in forward areas and new identifications: During the final days of the TENGCHUNG fighting, about 1,200 - 1,500 Japs broke through the road-block south of LUNGLING and moved northwest around LUNGLING, occupying high ground to the north. This did not develop into a move north to TENGCHUNG or northeast along the BURMA ROAD. At present, this group (600 - 800 remaining) is withdrawing south to LUNGLING. Since the start of the fighting at the road-block, no additional reinforcements have come up from MANGSHIH. What appeared to be the start of a counter-offensive has, thus far, failed to develop.

In the road-block fighting, new identifications establish the presence of two battalions of the 16th Regt of the 2d Div. Other identifications establish the arrival of some replacement troops for the 56th Div. North of, and exclusive of MANGSHIH, Jap strength is placed at about 1,500. MANGSHIH strength is difficult to estimate, but it is doubtful if more than 1,000 are located there.

b. Movements, concentrations and rear-area establishments. The "rear-area" for the SALWEEN front can be taken as a general line LASHIO-HSENWI-MUSE-NAMKHAM.

There are three axes of movement to the SALWEEN front:

(i) KATHA-BHAMO-NAMKHAM-MUSE-MANGSHIH. Movement of Japs from KATHA to the east along this route is primarily of troops which are drawn from anti-Xray reserves made available by lack of pressure from Xray in the north. These are primarily 53d and 18th Divs troops.

(ii) LASHIO-HSENWI-MUSE-MANGSHIH. Movement from LASHIO involves fresher troops in organizations nearer T/O strength. These troops must be drawn from the general Burma reserve, and commitment of such reserves requires a Jap strategic decision in the light of the total Burma situation.

(iii) LASHIO-HSENWI-KUNLONG. Recent movements:

Route 1 --- A definite shift of troops from KATHA to BHAMO has taken place, but in spite of reports of movements or impending movements from BHAMO to the SALWEEN there is little concrete evidence that more than a few hundred replacements have arrived at the SALWEEN from this direction.

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Route 2 --- It is now well established that two battalions of the 16th Regt, 2nd Div, arrived in MANGSHIH Sept 2 from LASHIO. POWs claim the entire 2d Div is enroute to MANGSHIH, but to-date, only two battalions can be considered present.

Route 3 --- Since Sept 6 there have been reports of the movement of 4,000 Inf and 800 - 1,000 Cavalry from HSENWI to KUNLONG. An air recon Sept 12 reported heavy mg fire and considerable new constructions in the KUNLONG area.

Present location of reserves: we may take as available for intervention 5 battalions of the 2d Div, 5 battalions of the 53d Div, and the equivalent of 1 battalion of the 13th Div located in the BHAMO - LASHIO - MANGSHIH triangle. These reserves are located in the NAMKHAM-MUSE area and in the HSENWI area primarily.

The most significant rear area establishment is the 33d Army Hq currently believed to be in HSENWI. HSENWI is the point at which reserves from LASHIO can be diverted either north to MANGSHIH or east to KUNLONG. Both the HSENWI-MUSE road and the HSENWI-KUNLONG road are now restricted areas and closely guarded.

c. Terrain and weather as they affect the enemy. With the end of the monsoon in sight, weather can no longer be considered as an obstacle to operations and greater enemy mobility can be taken for granted. Considering the present condition of the CEF, terrain can be considered the chief factor limiting Jap capabilities, except along the axis of the Burma Road.

(2) Conclusion.

a. Enemy capabilities: Offensive.

(i) From BHAMO to TENGCHUNG to threaten the Chinese flank from the north. Such a move would draw on tired and poorly equipped troops. There is no present indication of such a move. It has very low probability.

(ii) Along the axis of the BURMA ROAD. Preliminary indications of such a move would be: movement of troops and supplies to MANGSHIH, clearing of MANGSHIH - LUNGLENG road, and establishment of positions north of LUNGLENG as a protection against Chinese moving south from TENGCHUNG. Although reports received during the past two weeks have indicated that all these things were being done, the expected reinforcements have not materialized and during the past 24 hours the Japs have been withdrawing from north of LUNGLENG, with some movement to MANGSHIH from LUNGLENG reported. This does not eliminate an attack along the BURMA ROAD as a capability, but it lessens its immediate probability.

(iii) From KUNLONG north along the SALWEEN or east into the KOKANG, attempting to cut the BURMA ROAD in our rear. If present reports of Jap movements to KUNLONG were true it would indi-

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cate some offensive intention since such reinforcements are not warranted by Jap defensive needs in the KUNLONG area. With the rice crop ready for harvest and the negligibility of Chinese forces in the area, terrain would constitute the main, although not the insuperable, obstacle. However, it is believed that Jap strength in KUNLONG is greatly exaggerated and that a Jap offensive there is not probable.

b. Defensive.

The move of the 33d Army Hq to HSENWI and the movement of supplies and troops up from LASHIO are capable of a purely defensive interpretation. Before the monsoon, the Jap defense of North BURMA was based on the MYITTHINA - MOGAUNG area, with the 56th Div holding the SALWEEN flank. As a result of the capture of MYITTHINA and MOGAUNG the Jap supply route from Central BURMA thru KATHA will be subject to increasingly heavy air attacks from the MYITTHINA air base. A more convenient route of supply for both the anti-Kray and anti-Yoke forces would run from MANDALAY to LASHIO and north. HSENWI now becomes the logical Hq for the direction of the defense against both forces, and the HSENWI-NAMHAI-WANTING area becomes the best area in which to locate reserves which could easily be shifted against Kray or Yoke as the tactical situation demanded. Such a defense could be conducted without drawing additional Jap strength from other BURMA areas. Opposing Yoke, the Japs could develop MANGSALA as the main defensive area. If the LASHIO-HSENWI-WANTING road is the main route of supply, it would explain the strengthening of the Jap position in the KUNLONG area to guard against a possible Chinese thrust from KUNLONG to HSENWI.

c. Withdrawal.

Although events outside of BURMA or in other BURMA areas may eventually force the Japs to abandon the entire SALWEEN area, there are no indications that this is contemplated at present. The arrival of the 2d Div is, on the contrary, an indication that a voluntary withdrawal is not likely. With forces now on hand, the Japs can still conduct a stiff defense against the opening of the BURMA ROAD.

On our immediate front, the withdrawal from north of LUNGLENG has been unexpected. It is possible that this is due (1) to the fall of TENGCHONG, putting an end to what may have been a relief force or (2) to the unexpected heavy casualties suffered by the Japs in the road-block fighting and in the NANCHANG area. It is too early to judge whether or not a general withdrawal from LUNGLENG is also contemplated.

Of the capabilities listed, 'Defensive' as presented above is considered most probable.

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